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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment of the Second 
Judicial District. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A., 
1953, § 78-2-2 (3) (j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Does U.C.A., 1953, § 63-30-3 create absolute immunity for 
the construction of flood control improvements? 
2. Assuming § 63-30-3 creates absolute immunity, does it 
violate article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution? 
3. Is article I, § 22 of the Utah State Constitution self-
executing? 
4. Does U.C.A., 1953, § 63-30-10.5 apply retroactively to a 
claim based on article 1, § 22 of the Utah State Constitution? 
5. Where construction of a public improvement causes damage 
to private property, can a plaintiff allege alternative claims in 
inverse condemnation and negligence? 
6. Where construction of a lawfully authorized public 
improvement causes damage to private property, can a plaintiff 
recover in inverse condemnation for non-intentional damages? 
7. Where construction of a lawfully authorized public 
improvement permanently impairs the value of private property, and 
such impairment is a foreseeable consequence of the construction, 
has there been a taking under the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution? 
8. Where the state and a private party enter into an easement 
contract, and the easement right is abused, is the state liable for 
breach of contract? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Const, article I, § 11: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy 
by due course of law, which shall be administered without 
denial or unnecessary delay . . • . 
Utah Const, article I, § 22: "Private property shall not be 
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." 
Utah Const, article I, § 24: "All laws of a general nature 
shall have a uniform operation." 
U.C.A., 1953, § 63-30-3: 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all 
governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury which 
results from the exercise of a governmental function . . . . 
The management of flood waters and other natural disasters 
and the construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm 
systems by governmental entities are considered to be 
governmental functions, and governmental entities and their 
officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or 
damage resulting from those activities. 
U.C.A., 1953, § 63-30-10.5: 
1. Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for the recovery of compensation from the governmental 
entity when the governmental entity has taken or damaged 
private property without just compensation. 
2. Compensation and damages shall be assessed according 
to the requirements of Chapter 34, Title 78. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Course of Proceedings 
The plaintiff, Farmers New World Life Insurance Company 
("Farmers"), sued Bountiful City ("Bountiful") and others for 
damages to a commercial mall owned by Farmers. One of Farmers' 
claims against Bountiful was in inverse condemnation under article 
2 
I, § 22 of the Utah Constitution. Bountiful moved for summary 
judgment on all claims, and the trial court granted the motion (the 
"first ruling"). 
Farmers amended its complaint and added inverse condemnation 
claims against Bountiful under the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. Bountiful moved to dismiss the new claims, 
and the trial court again granted the motion (the "second ruling"). 
Farmers appeals both the first and second rulings. 
B. Relevant Facts 
Farmers is the owner of a commercial building located in 
Bountiful known as Fifth South Plaza ("the mall"). Bordering the 
south wall of the mall is a natural waterway known as "Mill Creek." 
(Record 4,6 (hereinafter "R."); Addendum 4,6 (hereinafter "Add.".)) 
In 1985 Bountiful built a concrete channel lining ("the 
culvert") in Mill Creek adjacent to the mall. Construction of the 
culvert was authorized, approved, and funded in part by Davis 
County pursuant to its flood control authority. (R. 230-31, 244; 
Add. 26-27, 30.) Bountiful obtained from Farmers a deed granting 
a right of way and easement that allowed Bountiful to construct and 
maintain the culvert. (R. 374-79.) 
Prior to construction, the south wall of the mall received 
important lateral support from Mill Creek's north embankment. 
Because the culvert construction involved the possible excavation 
of the embankment, it posed the risk of removing the lateral 
support unless special precautions were taken, such as shoring or 
bracing the south wall. The construction also posed the risk that 
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Mill Creek might be diverted against the south wall of the mall. 
Bountiful was aware of or should have been aware of these risks. 
(R. 7, 8, 16, 17; Add. 7, 8, 16, 17.) Bountiful chose defendant 
McNeil Construction Company ("McNeil") to build the culvert. The 
contract gave Bountifulfs engineer the right to inspect McNeil's 
work and order that special precautions, such as shoring and 
bracing, be taken. (R. 7-8, 13, 231; Add. 7-8, 13, 27.) 
McNeil's construction of the culvert caused physical damage to 
the mall by McNeil's excavation of the north embankment of Mill 
Creek without shoring or bracing the mall's south wall. The 
resulting loss of lateral support extensively damaged the mall. 
In addition, McNeil diverted Mill Creek against the mall's south 
wall. The water seeped through spaces in the wall panels and 
damaged the mall and its sewer system. The damage rendered certain 
portions of the mall uninhabitable. (R. 8-10, 22; Add. 8-10, 22.) 
Farmers filed this lawsuit against Bountiful and McNeil for 
the damages caused by the construction of the culvert. Farmers 
included as co-defendants the architect, contractor, and developers 
who originally designed, constructed, and developed the mall. (R. 
3; Add. 3.) Bountiful moved for summary judgment on the ground 
that U.C.A., 1953, § 63-30-3 provides absolute immunity for 
construction of a flood control system. (R. 217-93, 294-302.) 
Farmers opposed the motion, asserting (1) that § 63-3 0-3 does not 
provide absolute immunity; (2) that, regardless of § 63-30-3, 
Farmers had a right of action based on inverse condemnation; and 
(3) that the easement created an implied contract that estopped 
4 
Bountiful from denying liability. (R. 354-79.) In its first 
ruling, the trial court held that: 
1. Section 63-30-3 provides absolute immunity for any damages 
resulting from the construction of a flood control system; 
2. Farmers has no right of action under article I, § 22 of 
the Utah Constitution because the provision is not self-executing; 
3. Even if article I, § 22 were self-executing, it does not 
extend to actions arising out of negligently tortious conduct and 
therefore Farmers had not stated a claim under that section; 
4. Section 63-30-10.5, which waives governmental immunity for 
claims based on the taking or damaging of private property for 
public use without just compensation, does not apply to this case 
because it was enacted after the case was filed and is not 
retroactive; and 
5. No basis existed for an implied contract claim. (R. 394-
97; Add. 54-57; see also minute entry at R. 380, Add. 53.) 
Thereafter, Farmers amended its complaint to add inverse 
condemnation claims based on the Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. (R. 348-427; Add. 58-87.) On a motion to 
dismiss by Bountiful, the trial court dismissed these claims on the 
ground that Farmers had not alleged a "taking" within the scope of 
the Fifth Amendment. (R. 657-60; Add. 88-91.) 
5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court erroneously interpreted § 63-30-3 as creating 
absolute immunity. The plain language of the statute creates only 
qualified immunity. If the statute were interpreted to create 
absolute immunity, then it would violate the equal protection 
clause of the Utah Constitution. 
Regardless of this statutory immunity, Farmers is entitled to 
sue Bountiful for inverse condemnation under article I, § 22 of the 
Utah Constitution. The holding of Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 
354 P.2d 105 (Utah I960), should be overruled because article I, 
§ 22 is self-executing and therefore constitutes a waiver of 
sovereign immunity. Fairclough's reasoning is unsupported; it is 
against the great weight of modern authority; and it violates the 
fundamental purpose and policy of article I, § 22. Farmers is also 
entitled to sue under § 63-30-10.5. This section applies 
retroactively because it simply provides a procedure for enforcing 
a pre-existing constitutional right. 
The trial court erred because inverse condemnation can be 
asserted in cases arising out of negligent or tortious conduct. 
The trial court misunderstood the elements of inverse condemnation, 
which are wholly independent of the elements of negligence. Intent 
to cause damage is not an element of inverse condemnation. The 
better-reasoned cases hold that, regardless of intent, a plaintiff 
is entitled to compensation for physical injury substantially 
caused by a deliberately designed and constructed public 
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improvement. Farmers properly alleged such elements of inverse 
condemnation. 
Bountiful's construction of the culvert also resulted in an 
uncompensated taking under the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. The Fifth Amendment protects against the unfair, 
uncompensated taking of private property. A physical taking is 
unnecessary; the uncompensated destruction or impairment of the 
property's usefulness also results in an improper taking. The 
determination of whether a taking has occurred hinges on the facts 
alleged here. The facts alleged in Farmer's amended complaint 
clearly indicate that a cause of action exists. 
Finally, the trial court erred when it found, as a matter of 
law, that no implied contract existed between Farmer's and 
Bountiful. The city's contractual obligations remain an unresolved 
factual issue which precludes summary judgment. Bountiful clearly 
entered into a contractual relationship with Farmers; the effect 
of the agreement cannot be properly determined within the limits 
of summary judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: Standard of Review 
As discussed above, Farmers is appealing from (1) the trial 
court's first ruling, which granted Bountiful's motion for summary 
judgment and (2) the trial court's second ruling, which granted 
Bountiful's motion to dismiss. 
This Court's review of the two rulings is based on similar 
though slightly differing standards of review. (1) In reviewing 
7 
an appeal from a summary judgment, this Court views the facts and 
reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the 
party opposing the motion. E.g., Atlas v. Clovis National Bank, 
737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). (2) In reviewing an appeal from a 
motion to dismiss, this Court will not dismiss if there is any 
state of facts provable under the allegations of the complaint to 
support plaintifffs claim. E.g., Corporation of the President v. 
Wallace. 573 P.2d 1285, 1288 (Utah 1978). 
POINT II: Section 63-30-3 Should Be Interpreted As Creating Only 
Qualified Immunity for Flood Control Construction 
The trial court ruled that U.C.A., 1953, § 63-30-3 provides 
absolute immunity to governmental entities for damages resulting 
from a flood system, and thus Bountiful was immune from suit in 
this case. Farmers challenges this ruling. 
Section 63-30-3 begins with a statement of qualified immunity. 
"Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all 
governmental entities are immune from suit from any injury which 
results from the exercise of a governmental function...." 
Paragraph 2 of § 63-30-3 defines flood control activities, 
including construction of flood control systems, as a governmental 
function, and then states: "[Governmental entities and their 
officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or 
damage resulting from those activities." 
Farmers submits that the trial court's interpretation ignores 
the plain language of the statute. Paragraph 2 of § 63-30-3 does 
not use the phrase "absolute immunity" anywhere. Nothing in this 
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paragraph overrides the qualified immunity stated at the beginning 
of the section. The final clause in paragraph two extends the 
qualified immunity to not just governmental entities, but also to 
"their officers and employees," which the first paragraph does not 
do. 
Furthermore, the interpretation adopted by the trial judge 
leads to unconstitutional results, and should therefore be avoided. 
E.g. , State v. Lindcruist, 674 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1983); State v. Wood, 
648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982). This interpretation violates the equal 
protection clause of the Utah Constitution, article I, § 24, which 
states, "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation." 
The first step in applying article I, § 24 is to determine the 
appropriate standard of review for evaluating the lawfulness of the 
discriminatory classification. The strictness of the standard 
depends on the right or interest discriminated against. Malan v. 
Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 674 n. 17 (Utah 1984). The right involved in 
this case is the right to a full remedy for an injury to property, 
which is an important right guaranteed by the open courts clause 
of the Utah Constitution, article I, section 11. See Condemarin 
v. University Hospital, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (1989) ; Berry ex rel. 
Berrv v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). 
Accordingly, the standard of review appropriate in this case should 
have more bite than mere minimum scrutiny. Classifications should 
be reasonable, and the statute that creates the classification here 
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must in fact reasonably and substantially further the legislative 
purpose. Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d at 672, 673. 
The trial judge's interpretation of § 63-30-3, creates two 
classes of litigants: (1) those injured through flood control 
measures, and (2) those injured through other acts by governmental 
entities performing governmental functions. The first class is 
denied the right to sue in any case, whereas the second class may 
sue when they fit within one of the waiver provisions of § 63-30-
5 through 63-30-10.5. The critical issue is whether absolutely 
denying the first class the right to sue while allowing the second 
class to fall within the exceptions to immunity will strengthen 
flood control efforts. 
In the context of immediately imminent flooding constituting 
an emergency, the classification might make sense. In such a 
situation, the specter of liability might cause a governmental 
entity to hesitate to act, and such hesitation could be very costly 
in loss of lives or damage to property. 
In the context of long-term flood control improvements, 
however, which is what this case involves, there is no imminent 
danger, "no emergency requiring split-second action." Smith v. 
City of Los Angeles, 153 P.2d 69, 78 (Cal. 1944). A municipality 
has the time to properly plan and construct flood control 
improvements. There is no reason that under such circumstances, 
a municipality subjected to the qualified immunity of § 63-3 0-3 
would hesitate to construct flood control facilities anymore than 
it would hesitate to construct a road, a sewer, a drainage culvert 
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or any other necessary public improvement for which it also has 
only a qualified immunity• The statute discriminates unreasonably 
without advancing the legislative purpose of the statute. It is, 
therefore, unconstitutional• 
For the foregoing reasons, § 63-30-34 should create qualified 
immunity, or should be held unconstitutional in violation of 
article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution, 
POINT III: Article I, Section 22 Is Self-Executing 
and Constitutes Consent by the State to Be Sued 
Regardless of the immunity in § 63-30-3, Farmers is entitled 
to sue Bountiful in inverse condemnation under article I, § 22. 
That provision is self-executing. Because it is self-executing, 
the state waives its sovereign immunity, including any immunity 
under §63-30-3. 
A. Introduction. 
The eminent domain power of the State of Utah and its 
subdivisions is limited by article I, § 22 of the Utah 
Constitution, which provides: 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged 
without just compensation. 
Where a private individual brings an action for compensation 
under a provision like article I, § 22, such an action is often 
referred to as an "inverse condemnation" claim. It is so named 
because it is the inverse or reverse of the typical situation, 
where the state brings a condemnation action. See United States 
v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257, 100 S. Ct. 1127, 1130 (1980). 
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The trial court's first ruling asserted that the plaintiff 
could not bring an inverse condemnation action under article I, § 
22 because this provision is not "self-executing," i.e., it does 
not by itself create a cause of action but requires enabling 
legislation. See Black's Law Dictionary 1220 (5th ed. 1979)• In 
so holding, the trial court followed Fairclouah v. Salt Lake 
County, 354 P.2d 105 (Utah 1960) and its progeny, which hold that 
article I, § 22 is not self-executing. 
Farmers urges this Court to carefully review the Fairclouah 
decision. If it does so, it will see that the holding in 
Fairclouah is unsupported; that the great weight of authority is 
against Fairclouah and that Fairclouah violates the fundamental 
purpose and policy underlying article I, § 22. Therefore, 
Fairclouah should be overruled. 
B. The Fairclouah Decision. 
In Fairclouah. the plaintiffs sued Salt Lake County and the 
Utah Road Commission under article I, § 22 for damages to their 
land resulting from a 16 foot reduction of the grade of a street 
abutting their land. The defendants moved to dismiss on the basis 
of sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the motion, and the 
Utah Supreme Court reversed. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Henriod set forth the relevant 
law as follows: 
[Consistently and historically we have ruled that 
the State may not be sued without its consent; 
taken the view that article I, § 22 of our 
Constitution is not self-executing, nor does it 
give consent to be sued, implied or otherwise; and 
that to secure such a principle is a legislative 
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matter, a principle recognized by the legislature 
itself. [354 P.2d at 106 (footnotes omitted).] 
It should be noted that the foregoing sentence states four 
separate propositions of law: 
1. The state may not be sued without its consent; 
2. Article I, § 22 is not self-executing; 
3. Article I, § 22 does not constitute consent by the state 
to be sued; and 
4. Consent by the state to be sued is solely a legislative 
matter, and is never found in the Constitution. 
It should also be noted that the second, third, and fourth 
propositions do not logically follow from the first. Although the 
state may not be sued without its consent, the question remains 
whether article I, § 22 is self-executing and therefore constitutes 
such consent. 
Two justices concurred in the reasoning of the decision, and 
one concurred only in the result. The fifth justice, Justice Wade, 
filed a strong dissent. Justice Wade criticized the prevailing 
opinion as being unjust, contrary to article I, § 22, contrary to 
previous Utah decisions, unsupported, and contrary to the weight 
of authority and better-reasoned cases. His dissent in Fairelough 
refers to his dissent in a prior case, Springville Banking Co. v. 
Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100, 349 P.2d 157, 159-167 (1960), which 
analyzes in depth the same issues raised in Fairclough. See also 
Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117, 1122-24 (Utah 1975) (Bullock, 
District Judge, dissenting). 
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C. Reasons why Fairclouah should be overruled. 
This court should overrule Fairclouah, and therefore reverse 
the trial court, for the following reasons: 
1. The holding of Fairclouah is unsupported. 
Fairclouah begins with the general proposition that the state 
may not be sued without its consent. Farmers does not dispute this 
proposition. The question remains whether article I, § 22 is self-
executing and therefore gives such consent. 
Fairclouah answers this question negatively by stating, 
" [consistently and historically we have ... taken the view that 
article I, § 22 of our Constitution is not self-executing, nor does 
it give consent to be sued, implied or otherwise ... ." This 
statement is inaccurate, since prior to Fairclouah there was at 
least one Utah case holding that a right of action exists under 
article I, § 22. In Kimball v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 253, 90 P. 
395, 397 (1907), the court stated: 
Counsel, we think, overlook the purpose of the 
constitutional provision [article I, § 22,] which was 
expressly adopted to afford a relief not then existing to 
all whose property might thereafter be damaged. . . . It 
is manifest . . . that respondents are entitled to recover 
in this case under both the constitutional provision as 
well as under the statute aforesaid. 
See also State v. District Court, 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502, 508-
509 (1938); Croft v. Millard County Drainage District, 202 P.2d 539 
(Utah 1921); Webber v. Salt Lake City, 40 Utah 221, 120 P. 503 
(1911). 
Furthermore, the opinion does not cite a single Utah case that 
directly supports its statement that article I, § 22 is not self-
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executing. (Farmers is unaware of any such Utah cases.) In most 
of the Utah cases cited by Fa ire lough, the case either did not 
involve real property or, if it did, the decision did not directly 
address the self-executing nature of article I, § 22. See Jopes 
v. Salt Lake County, 9 Utah 2d 297, 343 P.2d 728 (1959) (injury to 
person); Bingham v. Board of Education. 118 Utah 582, 223 P.2d 432 
(1950) (same); State v. Tedesco. 4 Utah 2d 31, 286 P.2d 785 (1955) 
(self-executing nature of article I, § 22 not directly addressed); 
Hiorth v. Whittenburg, 121 Utah 324, 241 P.2d 907 (1952) (same); 
Campbell Building Co. v. State Road Commission, 95 Utah 242, 70 
P.2d 857 (1937) (same); Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 134 P. 626 
(1913) (same). 
Only two Utah cases cited by Fairclough directly address 
article I, § 22 in the opinion. In the first case, Springville 
Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100, 349 P.2d 157 (1960), the 
plaintiff claimed damages under article I, § 22, but conceded on 
appeal that the state could not be sued for lack of consent. The 
plaintiffs attempted to avoid the sovereign immunity problem by 
suing the road commissioners directly. Thus, the self-executing 
nature of article I, § 22 was not at issue. 
The second case, State v. District Court, 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 
502 (1938), contains the following dictum, ignored in Fairclough, 
which is directly contrary to Fairclough1s holding: 
We think it clear that the framers of the Constitution 
did not intend to give the rights granted by [article I,] 
§ 22, and then leave the citizen powerless to enforce such 
rights. 
. . . . 
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We think if a case arises where there is no other 
method of enforcing a constitutional right except by suit 
against the State, then it must be considered that the 
State has given its consent to be sued in such a case. [78 
P.2d at 508-509-] 
Fairclough also cites a number of cases from other 
jurisdictions. One of those cases, United States v. Lee. 106 U.S. 
196 (1882) , is contrary to Fairclough in that it indicates that the 
"just compensation" clause of the Fifth Amendment is enforceable 
by the courts and therefore self-executing. "Undoubtedly [this] 
provision of the Constitution [is] of the character which it is 
intended the courts shall enforce, when cases involving their 
operation and effect are brought before them." 106 U.S. at 218. 
A clearer statement of this rule was recently made in First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 107 S.Ct. 2378 
(1987), which expressly holds the "just compensation" clause of the 
Fifth Amendment to be self-executing. 107 S. Ct. at 2386. 
In summary, then, Fairclough1s holding fails to cite contrary 
Utah authority and is substantially lacking in support from the 
cases it does cite. 
2. Fairclough is contrary to the great weight of modern 
authority* 
The great weight of modern authority is contrary to Fairclough. 
At least 21 states currently have constitutional provisions, 
similar to Utah's, providing that private property may not be taken 
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or damaged for public use without just compensation. Of these 
states, at least 15 have held their constitutional provisions to 
be self-executing. Pima County v. Bilby, 87 Ariz. 366, 351 P. 2d 
647 (1960); Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942); 
Board of County Commissioners v. Adler, 69 Colo. 290, 194 P. 621 
(1920); Adams v. City of Atlanta, 253 Ga. 581, 322 S.E.2d 730 
(1984); People v. City of Mt. Vernon, 404 111. 58, 88 N.E.2d 45 
(1949); Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069, 34 So. 2d 321 (1948); Page 
v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District, 377 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. 
1964); Austin v. Hennepin County, 130 Minn. 359, 153 N.W. 738 
(1915) ; Wright v. Jackson Municipal Airport Authority, 300 So. 2d 
805 (Miss. 1974); Alexander v. State, 142 Mont. 93, 381 P.2d 780 
(1963); Parriott v. Drainage District, 226 Neb. 123, 410 N.W.2d 97 
(1987) ; Derby Heights, Inc. v. Gantt Water and Sewer District, 237 
S.C. 144, 116 S.E.2d 13 (1960); Hurley v. State, 82 S.D. 156, 143 
N.W.2d 722 (1966) (self-executing in absence of adequate remedy); 
Burns v. Board of Supervisors, 218 Va. 625, 238 S.E.2d 823 (1977); 
Wyoming State Highway Dept. v. Napolitano, 578 P.2d 1342, 1346-47 
(1978). See also cases cited at Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117, 
Alaska Const. , art. I, § 18; Ariz. Const., art. II, § 17; 
Calif. Const., art. I, § 19; Colo. Const., art. II, § 15; Ga. 
Const., art. I, § 3, f 1; 111. Const., art. I, § 15; La. Const., 
art. I, § 4; Mo. Const., art. I, § 26; Minn. Const., art. I, § 13; 
Miss. Const., art. Ill, § 17; Mont. Const., art. II, § 29; Neb. 
Const., art. I, § 21; N.M. Const., art. II, § 20; N.D. Const., art. 
I, § 16; Okla. Const., art. II, § 23; S.C. Const., art. I, § 17; 
S.D. Const., art. IV, § 13; Tex. Const., art. I, § 17; Va. Const., 
art. I, § 11; W.Va. Const., art. Ill, § 9; Wyo. Const., art. I, § 
33; see also Nichols on Eminent Domain, vol. 2 § 6.01[3] n. 42; 
vol. 7A § 14.03[1] n. 104 (rev'd 3rd eds. 1985 & 1988); see 
generally 2A Nichols on Eminent Domain § 6.26 (rev'd 3rd ed. 1987). 
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1123 n. 6 (Utah 1975) (Bullock, District Judge, dissenting); 3 
Nichols on Eminent Domain §§ 8.1[2] n. 15.01 & 8.1[4] nn. 24.2, 
24.341 (rev'd 3rd ed. 1985); 27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain § 482 
n. 5 (1966). 
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has held the "just 
compensation" clause of the Fifth Amendment to be self-executing. 
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 107 S. 
Ct. 2378, 2386 (1987). 
Nichols has summarized the state of the law as follows: 
The "damage clause" is generally held to be self-
executing; that is, if the legislature authorizes the 
construction of a public work which may injuriously affect 
neighboring property and fails to provide a special 
procedure for ascertaining and recovering damages, ... the 
owner of the injured property is allowed to recover his 
damages in an ordinary civil action. [2A Nichols on 
Eminent Domain, § 6.27[4] (rev'd 3rd ed. 1987).] 
If the constitutional provision is self-executing, it follows 
that the state has waived its sovereign immunity and consented to 
suit. E.g., Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942); 
Board of County Commissioners v. Adler, 69 Colo. 290, 194 P. 621 
(1920); Srb v. Board of County Commissioners, 601 P.2d 1082 (Colo. 
App. 1979) ; Donovan v. Delaware Water and Air Resources Commission, 
358 A.2d 717 (Del. 1976); Hoekstra v. County of Kankakee, 48 111. 
App. 3d 1059, 365 N.E.2d 553 (1977); Bernard v. State, 127 So. 2d 
774 (La. App. 1961); Alexander v. State, 142 Mont. 93, 381 P.2d 780 
(1963); Tomasek v. State, 196 Or. 120, 248 P.2d 703 (1952); Makela 
v. State, 205 A.2d 813 (Ver. 1964); Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 
334 N.W.2d 67 (1983); see also Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 
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10 Utah 2d 100, 349 P.2d 157, 159-167 (1960) (Wade, J., 
dissenting); Nichols on Eminent Domain, vol, 3, § 8.1[4] & vol. 6A, 
§ 30.1 n.12 (rev'd 3rd ed. 1985). 
Such a constitutional waiver of immunity supercedes the 
statutory attempts via § 63-30-3 to create immunity. A case 
directly on point is Short v. Pierce County, 78 P.2d 610 (Wash. 
1938), in which the state of Washington passed a law immunizing 
counties from liability for flood control actions. The plaintiffs1 
property was damaged by the county's emergency actions in the face 
of an impending flood, and by its actions taken to construct flood 
control improvements after the flood danger had passed. The 
plaintiffs sued in inverse condemnation. As to the second class 
of damages (those incurred after the flood danger had passed), the 
court ruled that the counties "had no right to use appellants1 
property and to damage [it] ... without compensation" despite the 
flood control immunity statute. Id. at 616. 
This Court should follow the weight of modern authority and 
hold article I, § 22 to be a self-executing waiver of sovereign 
immunity. 
3. The rule in Fairclough is contrary to the fundamental 
purpose and policy underlying article I, § 22. 
The Fairclough decision shows an understandable concern with 
preserving sovereign immunity. Unfortunately, it chooses to do so 
at the expense of citizen's rights under article I, § 22. 
The purpose of article I, § 22 was to create a right which did 
not exist at common law. Oklahoma City v. Collins-Dietz-Morris 
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Co. , 79 P. 2d 791, 794 (Okla. 1938); see Kimball v. Salt Lake 
County, 90 P. 395, 397 (1907). If solely dependent on enabling 
legislation, such a right is hollow and meaningless because the 
legislature can vitiate the right by simply refusing or failing to 
enact a remedy. See State v. District Court, 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 
502, 508 (1938). 
The need for article I, § 22 to be self-executing is heightened 
by the words, "or damaged." Prior to the addition of this term to 
state constitutions, compensation was allowed only for actual 
physical takings of property. Cook v. Salt Lake City, 157 P. 643, 
645 (1916). With the rapid growth of public improvements in the 
early 1800fs, injuries frequently occurred that were non-
compensable, or damnum absque injuria, under the old rule. 2 
Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 6.22 (rev'd 3rd ed. 1985). Beginning 
with Illinois in 1870, the states began to add the words "or 
damaged" to their constitutions to allow compensation for damages 
arising out of the construction of public improvements. Twenty-
Second Corporation v. Oregon Short Line Ry. Co., 103 P. 243, 246 
(1909); Kimball v. Salt Lake County, 90 P. 395, 396-97 (1907); 2A 
Nichols on Eminent Domain § 6.26 (rev'd 3rd ed. 1987). 
It is often difficult if not impossible to determine such 
damage in condemnation proceedings held prior to construction of 
the improvement. See Cities Service Gas Co. v. Huebner, 200 Okl. 
521, 197 P.2d 985 (1948). Accordingly, such damage is more 
appropriately remedied by allowing private suits after the 
improvement is completed when the damages can be definitely 
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determined. See Rose v. State, 123 P.2d 505, 513 (Cal. 1942). 
The rule in Fairclouah prevents suits for damages occurring after 
the fact, and in essence reverts to the old rule of damnum absque 
injuria. 
Furthermore, a major policy underlying article I, § 22 is to 
distribute the burdens for injuries arising out of public 
improvements among the entire public, so that such burden is not 
borne by a single individual. Kimball v. Salt Lake County, 90 P. 
395, 397 (1907); see also United States v. Willow River Power Co., 
324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945). Such a distribution of burdens is fair, 
equitable and just, and conforms with the notions of a civilized 
society and with the modern view that individual property rights 
should not be sacrificed to the interests of the State. As Justice 
Traynor succinctly stated: 
The construction of the public improvement is a deliberate 
action of the state or its agency in furtherance of public 
purposes. If private property is damaged thereby the state 
or the agency must compensate the owner therefore, whether 
the damage was intentional or the result of negligence on 
the part of the governmental agency. The decisive 
consideration is whether the owner of the damaged property 
if uncompensated would contribute more than his proper 
share to the public undertaking. [Clement v. State 
Reclamation Board, 220 P.2d 897, 905 (Cal. 1950) (citations 
omitted, emphasis added).] 
Fairclough violates this policy by forcing individuals to bear the 
entire burden for damages caused by a public improvement. 
4. Conclusion. 
This Court has previously observed that private property rights 
should not be made subservient to the sovereign power of the state. 
21 
In Croft v. Millard County Drainage District, 202 P. 539, 541 (Utah 
1921), this Court stated: 
Even the state itself, when acting within the scope of its 
sovereign powers, cannot take or damage private property 
for public use without just and adequate compensation to 
the person to whom the property belongs. 
[Article I, § 22] is a fundamental law of the 
commonwealth, binding upon every department of the state 
government. It is the duty of the courts to give it full 
force and effect whenever it is properly invoked by one 
claiming its protection, even against the sovereign power 
of the state. 
This Court should give "full force and effect" to article I, 
§ 22 by declaring it to be a self-executing waiver of the state's 
sovereign immunity. Unless this is done, the right to recover just 
compensation for damage to private property for a public use is of 
no value. 
POINT IV: Section 63-30-10.5 Applies Retroactively 
Even if this Court were to rule that article I, § 22 is not 
self-executing, Farmers would be entitled to sue under U.C.A., 
1953, § 63-30-10.5, which provides: 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived for the recovery of compensation from the 
governmental entity when the governmental entity has taken 
or damaged private property without just compensation. 
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed 
according to the requirements of Chapter 34, Title 78. 
This provision reflects the legislature's decision to allow 
inverse condemnation under article I, § 22 by expressly waiving 
immunity for such suits and by providing a procedure for 
determining compensation and damages in such suits. 
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The trial court ruled that Farmers could not sue under § 63-
30-10.5 because this lawsuit predates the enactment of the statute 
and the statute is not retroactive* (R. 395-96; Add. 55-56.) 
This ruling is erroneous. Even if article I, § 22 were not 
self-executing, this provision nevertheless creates a substantive 
constitutional right to just compensation. See Oklahoma City v. 
Collins-Dietz-Morris Co.. 79 P.2d 791f 794 (Okla. 1938). This 
right to just compensation has existed continuously, but lacks a 
procedural method to remedy any violation. "Statutes which are 
procedural only and do not create, alter or destroy substantive 
rights may be applied to causes of action that have accrued or are 
pending at the time the statute is enacted." Carlucci v. Utah 
State Industrial Commission, 725 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Utah 1986); 
Pilcher v. State, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983). The language of § 63-
30-10.5 clearly provides the necessary procedure for enforcing that 
right. Therefore, according to established legal principles § 63-
30-10.5 should be applied retroactively. 
Furthermore, amendments to the Governmental Immunity Act should 
be applied retroactively where the legislature manifestly intended 
such application. Frank v. State, 613 P. 2d 517 (Utah 1980) 
(applying amendment to § 63-30-3 retroactively) . In this case, 
§ 63-30-10.5 was passed not long after the amendment to § 63-30-3 
creating immunity for flood control actions. The manifest 
legislative intent of § 63-30-10.5 is to allow persons whose 
property was unconstitutionally taken or damaged by flood control 
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measures to sue for just compensation. Accordingly, this section 
should be applied retroactively, 
POINT V: Plaintiff Has Sufficiently Alleged a Claim for Inverse 
Condemnation under Article I, Section 22 
As an alternative ground for its first ruling, the trial court 
held that even if article I, § 22 were self-executing, plaintiff 
had not adequately stated a claim thereunder because article I, § 
22 does not apply to non-intentional, negligent conduct. The trial 
court stated: 
Even if § 22 were self-executing, inverse condemnation 
actions thereunder would be limited to situations arising 
out of the taking or damaging of tangible private property 
for public use, intentionally made by public officers, and 
would not extend to actions arising out of negligently 
tortious conduct. [R. 395; Add. 55.] 
Thus, the trial court ruled that (1) inverse condemnation 
cannot be based on negligent or tortious conduct, and (2) intent 
to take or damage is an essential element of inverse condemnation. 
In so ruling, the trial court accepted Bountiful1s arguments that 
inverse condemnation does not apply to or damages arising from 
negligent acts or unintended damages (citing Lund v. Salt Lake 
County, 200 P. 510 (Utah 1921)) and that if unintentional damages 
were allowed then inverse condemnation would "swallow up" 
governmental immunity. (R. 490-91, 494; Add. 46-47, 50.) 
The trial court's ruling is in error for the following reasons: 
(A) Farmers1 inverse condemnation claim is not based on negligence; 
(B) Farmers is entitled to plead inverse condemnation and 
negligence as alternative claims; (C) intent to cause damages is 
not an element of inverse condemnation; and (D) allowing 
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compensation for unintentional damages does not destroy 
governmental immunity• 
A. Farmers' Inverse Condemnation Claim Is Not Based on 
Negligence 
The trial court ruled that Farmers1 inverse condemnation claim 
could not be based on negligent conduct. This ruling demonstrates 
a misunderstanding of the legal theories underlying inverse 
condemnation and negligence and also of the allegations of Farmer's 
inverse condemnation claim. 
Inverse condemnation and negligence are wholly independent 
claims based on entirely different legal theories. Inverse 
condemnation is not based on negligence or tort concepts. State 
v. Adams, 105 P.2d 416, 419 (Okla. 1940); Biorvatn v. Pacific 
Mechanical, 464 P.2d 432 (Wash. 1970); see also 6A Nichols on 
Eminent Domain § 28.3 at 28-86 to 28-87 (rev'd 3rd ed. 1985). It 
is based on a constitutional provision that has "created a right 
which did not exist at common law." Oklahoma City v. Collins-
Dietz-Morris Co., 79 P.2d 791, 794 (Okla. 1938). Its elements are: 
(1) a taking or damaging (2) of private property (3) for public use 
(4) without just compensation. 
On the other hand, the elements of negligence are (1) a duty 
of reasonable care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) 
defendant's breach of that duty; (3) the breach's causation of 
injury; and (4) the suffering of damages by the plaintiff. 
Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985). 
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Thus, the better-reasoned cases hold that where the 
construction of a lawfully authorized public improvement causes 
damage to private property, the owner is entitled to recover 
regardless of whether the work was done negligently or properly. 
E.g. , Reardon v. City and County of San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492, 
6 P. 317, 325 (1885); Board of Commissioners v. Adler, 194 P. 621 
(Colo. 1920); City of Newport v. Rosing, 319 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1959); 
Thompson v. City of Philadelphia, 177 So. 39 (Miss. 1937) ; 
Jamestown Plumbing & Heating Co. v. City of Jamestown, 154 N.W.2d 
355 (N.D. 1968); Biorvatn v. Pacific Mechanical, 464 P.2d 432 
(Wash. 1970). 
For example, in Biorvatn v. Pacific Mechanical, 464 P.2d 432 
(Wash. 1970), the plaintiffs sued in inverse condemnation for the 
sinking of their foundation and consequent damage caused by the 
city's construction of a sewer adjacent to the house. The court 
held that sewer construction had resulted in removal of lateral and 
subjacent support, and that such removal was a damaging of property 
for a public use without just compensation. Regarding the issue 
of the city's possible negligence, the court stated: 
Even though plaintiffs here might have proved that the 
[city] and the contractor were negligent [in construction 
of the sewer], their entitlement to recovery did not depend 
upon such proof. Plaintiffs' right to recover here rested 
not on concepts of negligence but on proving that [the 
city], as condemnor, in exercising the power of eminent 
domain for construction of a sewer in adjoining property, 
inflicted a physical injury, directly and proximately 
causing damage to the plaintiffs' real property and 
improvements. [4 64 P.2d at 434.] 
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Similarly, in State v. Adams, 105 P.2d 416, 419 (Okla. 1940), 
the court stated: 
For the second ground for reversal, defendant urges 
that the State is not liable for the negligence of its 
officers and agents in the construction and operation of 
its highways . . • • But we think this assertion is based 
upon a misconception of the cause of action alleged by 
plaintiffs. • . . The action is predicated upon a right 
given by the Constitution. . . . The negligence of the 
officers and agents of the State is not the basis of 
plaintiffs' claim. The constitutional mandate that 
"private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation" is not restricted to non-
negligent injuries. It imposes a liability when private 
property is damaged for public use, negligence or no 
negligence. 
As in the foregoing cases, Farmers' right to recover in inverse 
condemnation rests not on concepts of negligence, but rather on 
alleging the elements of inverse condemnation, which Farmers has 
done. Farmers' inverse condemnation claim alleges that the 
foreseeable and direct consequence of the culvert construction 
contract was the removal of soil and diversion of the creek; that 
Farmers could not prevent such acts (presumably because of 
Bountiful's eminent domain power); that the removal of soil and 
diversion of the creek physically injured Farmers1 property; and 
that such injury constitutes a taking or damage of private property 
for public use without just compensation. (R. 17; Add. 17.) 
Accordingly, there was no basis for the trial court to dismiss 
Farmers1 inverse condemnation cause of action because it is based 
on negligence. 
B. Farmers Can Plead Inverse Condemnation and Negligence as 
Alternative Claims 
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In ruling that Farmers1 inverse condemnation claim cannot be 
based on negligent conduct, the trial court may have been referring 
to the fact that in addition to Farmers1 inverse condemnation claim 
against Bountiful, Farmers also claimed that Bountiful is liable 
for the negligence of McNeil. (R. 13-14; Add. 13-14.) Such an 
alternative claim, however, in no way precludes Farmers from 
asserting a claim for inverse condemnation. 
Although inverse condemnation is a wholly independent claim 
from negligence, sometimes a plaintiff may be able to allege both 
as alternative remedies. Lanning v. State Highway Commission, 515 
P.2d 1355 (Or. App. 1973). Thus it has been held that the mere 
fact that the governmental entity committed a tort does not relieve 
it from liability in inverse condemnation. In State v. Leeson, 84 
Ariz. 44, 323 P.2d 692, 696 (1958), the court stated: 
It is next urged [by the state] that the flooding of 
the appellee's premises was, if anything, no more than a 
tort for which the State of Arizona is not liable. We do 
not think this contention can be sustained. The 
constitution has reference to the interest invaded and not 
to the particular conduct leading to the invasion. Conduct 
which would be tortious if perpetrated by one individual 
on another may be compensable as a taking and damaging when 
perpetrated by the state upon an individual. 
Accord Board of Commissioners v. Adler, 194 P. 621 (Colo. 1920); 
Kinnischtzke v. City of Glen Ullin, 79 N.D. 495, 57 N.W.2d 588 
(1953); State v. Adams, 105 P.2d 416, 419 (Okla. 1940); Morrison 
v. Clackamas County, 18 P.2d 814 (Ore. 1933). 
Accordingly, there was also no basis for dismissing Farmers1 
inverse condemnation claim merely because Farmers1 also pleaded 
negligence as an alternative cause of action. 
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C Intent to Cause Damages Is Not an Element of Inverse 
Condemnation 
The trial court also ruled that Farmers failed to state a claim 
because inverse condemnation is limited to intentionally caused 
damages. This ruling is erroneous and sets an unreachable standard 
for proving that property has been "damaged" within the scope of 
the constitutional provision. 
In states whose constitutions contain an "or damaged" 
provision, the better-reasoned cases do not require intentional 
damage. Where property is physically injured by a public 
improvement as deliberately designed and constructed, the owner is 
entitled to compensation even though the damage is unintentional: 
The construction of the public improvement is a deliberate 
action of the state or its agency in furtherance of public 
purposes. If private property is damaged thereby the state 
or the agency must compensate the owner therefore, whether 
the damage was intentional or the result of negligence on 
the part of the governmental agency. 
Clement v. State Reclamation Board, 220 P.2d 897, 905 (Cal. 1950) 
(citations omitted); see also State v. Williams, 120 P.2d 496, 501 
(Wash. 1941) (immaterial whether damaging was "voluntary or 
involuntary"). 
A large number of cases supporting this view do not expressly 
state that intent need not be proved. Rather, they state that the 
plaintiff may recover whether the public improvement that caused 
the damage was constructed negligently or properly. E.g., Massetti 
v. Madrera Canal Co. . 68 P.2d 260 (Cal. App. 1937); Thompson v. 
City of Philadelphia. 177 So. 39 (Miss. 1937) ; Andrews v. Proctor, 
165 P.2d 610 (Okla. 1945). By implication, however, if the damage 
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was negligently caused it was not intentional• See Clement v. 
State Reclamation Board, supra. 
The cases following the view that intent is not required apply 
two different rules. The first, or "foreseeability rule," requires 
that the damage must be the foreseeable and probable consequence 
of intentional acts. "It is enough to show the damages were 
proximately caused by the undertaking of the project and a 
reasonable foreseeable consequence of the undertaking." Rauser v. 
Toston Irrigation District, 565 P.2d 632f 637 (Mont. 1977). This 
is the same rule applied by the federal courts for proving a taking 
under the Fifth Amendment. E.g., R.J. Widen Co. v. United States, 
357 F.2d 988 (Ct. CI. 1966); California v. United States, 151 F. 
Supp. 570 (1957); Clark v. United States. 8 CI. Ct. 649 (1985); see 
29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 110 at 449 & n. 40.5 (1965). Farmers' 
inverse condemnation claim satisfies the requirements of this rule 
by alleging such foreseeability in paragraph 86 of its complaint 
2 
and in the sixth cause of action of its "First Amended Complaint." 
The second, or "no foreseeability rule," does not even require 
that the damages be foreseeable. The most careful statement of the 
Paragraph 86 of Farmers1s complaint states: 
86. The foreseeable and probable consequence and direct 
result of Bountiful City's contract with McNeil 
Construction was the removal of soil from Farmer's property 
adjacent to the Mall and the diversion of water from Mill 
Creek next to the Mall. [R. 17; Add. 17.] 
These allegations were further clarified in the sixth cause of 
action of Farmers's "First Amended Complaint," which alleges that 
Bountiful City foresaw that damage might result from the 
construction but proceeded anyway. (R. 415-17; Add. 75-77.) 
30 
"no foreseeability" rule is found in the leading case of Albers v. 
County of Los Angeles. 42 Cal.Rptr. 89, 398 P.2d 129 (Cal. 1965). 
In Albers. the California Supreme Court upheld the right to sue in 
inverse condemnation for physical injuries caused by a landslide 
resulting from the construction of a highway. The court first 
thoroughly analyzed its prior cases as well as statements from 
Nichols on Eminent Domain, and then formulated the following rule: 
[With two exceptions], any actual physical injury 
to real property proximately caused by the 
improvement as deliberately designed and 
constructed is compensable under article I, section 
14, of our Constitution whether foreseeable or not. 
[398 P.2d at 137.]3 
Subsequent California cases have refined this rule by 
interpreting the words "proximately caused"—which imply a tort 
concept involving foreseeability, and therefore are undesirable— 
to mean a substantial cause-and-effeet relationship which excludes 
the probability that other forces alone produced the injury. 
Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control District, 47 Ca. 3d 550, 
253 Ca.Rptr. 693, 764 P.2d 1070, 1074-75 (Cal. 1988); see Holtz v. 
Superior Court, 3 Cal.3d 296, 90 Cal. Rptr. 345, 475 P.2d 441 
(1970). 
The California "no foreseeability" rule does not create open-
ended, absolute liability for inverse condemnation; rather, it 
The two exceptions include the state's common-law right to 
inflict damage and the state's right to inflict damage when such 
infliction of damage is within the proper exercise of police power. 
Neither of those exceptions apply in this case. The court also set 
forth five factors to be considered in making this determination. 
398 P.2d at 137. 
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gives effect to the constitutional provision in a way that achieves 
its policy of distributing losses caused by public improvements. 
Belair, supra, 764 P.2d at 1074; Holtz, supra. 
The theoretical basis for the "no foreseeability" rule is that 
the right created by the "or damaged" clause is not restricted to 
injuries that would be actionable at common law, but extends to any 
physical disturbance of a private property right caused by 
construction of a public improvement. Albers v. County of Los 
Angeles, supra, 398 P.2d at 134-35; see also Reardon v. City and 
County of San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492, 6 P. 317, 325 (1885); 6A 
Nichols on Eminent Domain § 6.30 (rev'd 3rd ed. 1987). Common 
instances of physical disturbances for which compensation is 
allowed, regardless of foreseeability, include removal of lateral 
support and water seepage. See Johnson v. City of St. Louis, 137 
F. 439 (C.C. Mo. 1905) (removal of lateral support) ; Ketcham v. 
Modesto Irrigation District. 135 Cal. App. 180, 26 P.2d 876 (1933) 
(water seepage) ; Tormey v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation District, 
200 P. 814 (Cal. App. 3rd 1921) (water seepage) ; Biorvatn v. 
Pacific Mechanical Construction, Inc., 464 P.2d 432 (Wash. 1970) 
(removal of lateral support); State v. Williams, 120 P. 2d 496 
(Wash. 1941) (removal of lateral support). 
In this regard, this Court has stated in Board of Education v. 
Croft, 373 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1962): 
Damages to land, by the construction of a public or 
industrial improvement, . . . [are] limited to injuries 
that would be actionable at common law, or where there has 
been some physical disturbance of a right, either public 
or private, which the owner enjoys in connection with his 
property and which gives it additional value, and which 
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causes him to sustain a special damage with respect to his 
property in excess of that sustained by the public 
generally. It requires a definite physical injury . . . 
such as . destroying lateral supports. [Emphasis 
added.] 
Even where the damages result from a temporary condition in the 
construction, as in the instant case, compensation for unforeseen 
damages has been allowed under inverse condemnation. In Oklahoma 
City v. Collins-Dietz-Morris Co., 79 P.2d 791 (Okla. 1938), a 
temporary condition in construction resulted in the flooding of the 
plaintiff's basement. The court upheld a judgment for the 
plaintiff, stating: 
If the injured party has been consequentially damaged 
by the construction of a public improvement, whether it was 
done carefully and with skill or not, he is entitled to 
compensation for such damage under the ["or damaged" 
provision of the state constitution]. 
[W]e see no valid reason for holding a municipalityfs 
liability in this situation is contingent upon whether the 
public improvement causing the damage is completed or in 
a temporary condition in the process of construction when 
the damage occurred. . . . [Consequential damages 
resulting from a temporary condition in the construction 
of a public improvement may be recovered under article 2, 
§ 24 of the constitution. [79 P.2d at 795.] 
The "foreseeability" and "no foreseeability" rules are much 
more consistent with the purpose of the "or damaged" provision of 
article I, § 22, than would be a rule of requiring intentional 
damages. This provision was added to state constitutions to extend 
the scope of the constitutional protection to damages arising from 
the construction of public improvements, and was intended to remedy 
the effects of the old damnum absque injuria rule that denied 
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compensation unless an actual physical taking occurred. Albers v. 
County of Los Angeles, supra; see also cases cited in part III.C.3, 
supra. Since the construction of public improvements often 
results in damages that are not intended at the time of the 
construction, then limiting "or damages" to mean only intentional 
damages defeats the original purpose for the rule and revives the 
old rule of damnum absque injuria. It also defeats the policy 
underlying the rule, to spread the burden caused by public 
improvements among all citizens. 
Farmers urges this Court to adopt a "no foreseeability" rule 
that allows recovery for physical damages substantially caused by 
the deliberate construction and design of a public improvement. 
Farmers urges the alternative adoption of a "foreseeability" rule. 
Under either rule Farmers is entitled to have this case remanded 
for further proceedings. 
* * * * * * * * 
In its reply memorandum before the trial court, Bountiful cited 
four cases in which compensation for unintentional (negligent) 
damages was denied. (R. 492; Add. 48.) One of these cases, Harris 
v. United States. 205 F.2d 765, 767-68 (10th Cir. 1953), is 
distinguishable because it only decides the question of whether the 
injury sustained was a "taking" (not a "damaging") and because the 
conduct causing the damage was a single ministerial act (the test 
firing of guns). 
Two of the cases relied on by Bountiful are distinguishable 
because they do not involve the construction of a public 
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improvement, but rather the ministerial acts of county or city 
employees: maintenance of public works or crop spraying. Havashi 
v. Alameda County Flood Control District. 334 P.2d 1048 (67 Cal. 
App. 2d 584, 334 P.2d 1048, 1053 (1959) (maintenance of public 
work); Dallas v. County Flood Control District v. Benson. 157 Tex, 
617, 306 S.W.2d 350 (1957) (spraying weeds). These cases follow 
the rule that mere ministerial acts do not constitute a "public 
use" and thus are not within the scope of the constitutional 
provision. McNeil v. City of Montague, 124 C.A.2d 326, 268 P.2d 
497 (1954); see Eriksen v. Anderson, 195 Va. 655, 79 S.E.2d 597 
(1954). In contrast, the construction of public works, which 
involves the right to condemn land under the power of eminent 
domain, does qualify as a public use. Hayashi v. Alameda County 
Flood Control District, (67 Cal. App. 2d 584, 334 P.2d 1048, 1053 
(1959); McNeil v. City of Montague, 124 C.A.2d 326, 268 P.2d 497 
(1954) . 
Bountiful also cited Lund v. Salt Lake County, 200 P. 510 (Utah 
1921) , for the proposition that the "the damages for which 
compensation is allowed under article I, § 22, of the state 
Constitution are such as are the direct consequences of the lawful 
exercise of the right of eminent domain, and that ordinarily such 
damages are unavoidable." Id. at 514 (emphasis added). 
In Lund the plaintiff was the owner of certain fish ponds. He 
sued in inverse condemnation for the destruction of his fish caused 
by the county's discharge of water from a reservoir, which water 
35 
flowed over a manure field, into plaintiff's fish ponds, and killed 
plaintiff's fish. 
Significantly, the analysis in Lund begins with the proposition 
that property must be taken or destroyed for a "public use," Lund 
then proceeds to give as examples of damaging for public use cases 
in which the damage resulted from the construction of a public 
improvement, E.g., Chicago v. Tavlor. 125 U.S. 161 (1888) 
(construction of viaduct)• 
Lund could have stopped there, and held that since the 
governmental act (release of water from reservoir) was not the 
construction of a public improvement but rather the ministerial act 
of county employees, then there was no "public use" and therefore 
article I, § 22 did not apply. But Lund added an additional 
requirement, i.e., that the damage be the unavoidable consequence 
of the act. Lund cites no authority for this view; rather, it 
adopts counsel's interpretation of a prior Utah case (Morris v. 
Oregon Shortline R. Co., 102 P. 629 (1909). 
Lund does not apply to this case for the following reasons: 
(1) Lund is distinguishable on its facts. It should be treated 
as standing for the narrow proposition that damages resulting from 
ministerial acts, such as maintenance of a public work, are not a 
public use. In fact, this Court appears to have distinguished Lund 
on that basis in Croft v. Millard County Drainage District, 202 P. 
539, 541 (1921), in which the Court sustained an action against a 
drainage district for damages caused by improperly constructed 
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drainage facilities. "The distinction [with Lund] readily appears 
upon a casual reading of the opinion." 202 P. at 541. 
(2) The standard set by Lund, that damages be "unavoidable," 
is too high. Such a standard would preclude most suits that the 
"or damaged" clause was intended to allow. The cases previously 
discussed show that it is sufficient to allege, as Farmers has 
done, that the damages were the foreseeable and probable 
consequence of the city's intentional acts. 
(3) The statement in Lund that the damages must be unavoidable 
is not in accord with modern authority and the better reasoned 
cases discussed previously in this section, and thus this statement 
should be overruled. 
D. Inverse Condemnation Does Not Destroy Governmental 
Immunity. 
One of Bountiful's arguments was that if inverse condemnation 
is extended too far, it will "swallow up" governmental immunity. 
When the various limitations of inverse condemnation are 
considered, it is difficult to see any real basis for this 
argument. These limitations include the following: 
1. Inverse condemnation does not apply to personal injury, 
only injury to property; 
2. The rule does not extend damages caused by momentary acts 
of carelessness, but is limited to damages caused by the deliberate 
design and construction of public works; Bauer v. County of 
Ventura, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 289 P.2d 1, 7 (1955); 
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3. As just discussed, it does not apply to damages caused by 
mere ministerial acts, which are not "for public use"; 
4. It does not apply to acts of the state made under necessity 
or emergency, such as in the face of an immediately impending 
flood. See Short v. Pierce County. 78 P.2d 610 (Wash. 1938). 
Furthermore, the purpose of article I, § 22 is to insure that 
individuals will not be forced to bear a disproportionate burden 
from the cost of public improvements. If this policy is to be 
enforced, then of a necessity sovereign immunity necessarily must 
be waived in some cases. As the California Supreme Court has 
pointed out: 
The tendency under our system is too often to sacrifice the 
individual for the community; and it seems very difficult 
in reason to show why the State should not pay for property 
which it destroys or impairs the value, as well as for what 
it physically takes. [Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 398 
P.2d 129, 137 (Cal. 1965).] 
POINT VI: Farmers Sufficiently Alleged a Taking Under the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution 
Farmers alleged in its amended complaint that Bountiful's acts 
resulted in a taking which violated the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution (R. 417, Add. 77). In order to pursue 
this cause of action, Farmers must show that it has correctly 
pleaded an unconstitutional taking. Dismissal is inappropriate if 
there is a "state of facts provable in support of [Farmers] claim.11 
Wells v. Walker Bank & Trust, 590 P.2d 1261, 1263 (Utah 1979). In 
this case, the trial court's dismissal of Farmers's amended 
complaint should be reversed. 
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The determination of whether a taking has occurred within the 
Fifth Amendment depends on the unique facts of each case. United 
States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958). The 
United States Supreme Court has held that no "rigid rules" exist 
that govern this determination, but that each case must be judged 
on its own facts. United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc.. 344 
U.S. 149, 156 (1952). The Court has identified, however, two 
important factors that must be considered in these essentially ad 
hoc factual inquiries. Penn Central Transportation Co. , v. New 
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). These are (1) the economic 
impact of the government's action, and (2) the character of the 
government's action. Id. In regard to the second factor, a 
physical invasion by the government is more likely to be a taking 
than a mere regulatory program. Id. Recent United States Supreme 
Court case law does not require a permanent "taking" to be shown; 
a temporary regulatory taking is sufficient to require 
compensation. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County 
of Los Angeles, 107 S.Ct. 2378 (1987). Thus, even if the taking 
here were only temporary/ it is still compensable. 
Bountiful has severely affected Farmers's property rights, with 
a corresponding negative economic impact on Farmers's investment. 
Farmers has alleged significant permanent damage to the mall, 
substantial reduction in the mall's value, and substantial 
impairment to the mall's usefulness by rendering it uninhabitable 
to its business occupants. In addition, Farmers has alleged the 
actual invasion of its property rights resulting from Bountiful's 
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removal of lateral support and its diversion of Mill Creek against 
the mall's foundation. Any doubts about Farmers' allegations and 
inferences should be resolved in favor of allowing Farmers to 
present proof of an unconstitutional taking. Wells v. Walker Bank 
& Trust Co. , 590 P.2d at 1263. When accepted as true, these 
allegations preclude dismissal. Id. 
POINT VII: Bountiful City Damaged Farmers by Abusing its Easement 
Rights; the Trial Court Ignored this Abuse and 
Wrongfully Granted Bountiful City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
In response to Bountiful's Motion for Summary Judgement, 
Farmers argued that the easement was a contract by which Farmers 
had certain implied rights and Bountiful had certain implied 
duties. Farmers further argued that Bountiful had abused the 
rights it had acquired under the easement. Id. In response to 
Bountiful's claim of immunity, Farmers argued that Bountiful was 
estopped from raising this argument because it had entered into a 
contract with Farmers when it accepted the easement (R. 3 61-64). 
Bountiful asserted in turn that the easement was not a contract and 
that it had not signed the easement and therefore had no 
obligations under it (R. 483-84; Add. 39-40). 
Based upon the pleadings, memoranda and arguments made before 
it, the trial court ruled that "there [was] no basis for an implied 
contract claim against Bountiful given the nature of dealings 
between the parties and the remote relationship between Bountiful 
and [Farmers]." (R. 396; Add. 56). The trial court has failed to 
properly assess the facts and analyze the law regarding easements. 
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An easement is an interest in land, an incorporeal 
hereditament, a liberty, privilege, right or advantage. See e.g., 
Kennedy v. Bond. 460 P.2d 809 (N. Mex. 1969); Perrin v. Derbyshire 
Scenic Acres Water Corp., 388 P.2d 949 (Wash. 1964). Contrary to 
Bountiful!s argument to trial court, a grantee does incur 
contractual obligations by accepting a conveyance transferring the 
property interest; the grantee's signature is unnecessary. 
Bracklein v. Realty Ins. Co. 80 P.2d 471, 477 (Utah 1948). By 
accepting the Right-Of-Way For A Creek Easement (the "Easement"), 
Bountiful acquired contractual rights and incurred contractual 
obligations. The rights include: 
a. A perpetual right-of-way and easement for the purpose 
of digging, laying concrete, connecting to and maintaining, 
cleaning and operation [sic] a creek and drainage facility 21' 
wide, being 10.5' on each side of the following described 
center line; 
b. The right of ingress and egress along said right-of-
way ; and 
c. The right to maintain, operate and replace [the 
drainage facility]. 
See Affidavit of Graham Ritchie (R. 374-79). 
Bountiful also incurred contractual obligations. First, the 
Easement expressly reserves to Farmers the right "to fully use the 
said premises except for the purpose which this right of way or 
easement is granted to [Bountiful]." Id. This express reservation 
is no different than the law in Utah: 
[t]he rights of the dominant owner [Bountiful] are 
limited by the rights of the servient owner 
[Farmers]. Each owner must exercise his rights so 
as not unreasonably to interfere with the other. 
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Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co, v. Movie, 174 P.2d 148, 158 (Utah 
1946) (citations omitted). Bountiful must respect the rights 
Farmers has to use its property and it has not. 
Bountiful also incurred an implied obligation to protect 
Farmersfs right of lateral support. The right of lateral support 
applies to any property interest or use. See Salt Lake City v. 
J.B. and R.E. Walker, Inc., 253 P.2d 365, 370 (Utah 1953) ; see also 
Holm v. Davis, 125 P. 403, 407 (Utah 1912); Laden v. Atkeson, 116 
P.2d 881, 884-84 (Mont. 1941). Consequently, Farmers' existing 
right to lateral support creates a corresponding obligation in 
Bountiful to preserve that support. 
In the present case, Bountiful exceeded its easement rights by 
unreasonably removing soil providing essential and significant 
lateral support to the mall. Its actions actually destroyed the 
easement and increased the burdens of the dominant tenement and 
injured and damaged the servient tenement. See Fletcher v. 
Stapleton, 10 P.2d 1019, 1020, 123 Cal.App. 133 (1932). Bountiful 
breached its contract. Farmers has alleged sufficient information 
constituting either breach of contract or trespass by Bountiful. 
The conduct of Bountiful has increased the burdens on the dominant 
tenement and damaged Farmers, the owner of the servient tenement. 
Trespass occurred when Bountiful abused its easement rights and 
breached its contract. In Laden v. Atkeson, 116 P. 2d at 884-85, 
the Montana Supreme Court said: 
If the owner of an easement exceeds his rights 
either in the manner or extent of its use, or if 
he enters upon or uses the land of the servient 
estate for any unauthorized purposes, he is guilty 
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of a trespass and the servient owner may obtain 
such action, although no actual damage has been 
sustained by him. 
Because Bountiful abused this easement by unnecessarily 
removing significant lateral support to the mall, it has breached 
its contractual obligations and trespassed. Consequently, this 
abuse increased the burdens of the dominant estate and damaged 
Farmers. Bountiful avoids these issues by focussing on 
governmental immunity issues. Governmental immunity does not 
absolve a governmental entity in a contractual relationship. 
Bountiful owes Farmers contractual obligations and must use its 
property rights in a fair and reasonable manner regardless of its 
governmental status. U.C.A., 1953, section 63-30-5. Farmers has 
been denied the right to recover contractual damages resulting from 
Bountiful's actions. The trial court, therefore, abused its 
discretion in dismissing Farmers1 complaint against Bountiful on 
the allegations constituting breach of contract and trespass. 
Because Farmers1 implied rights against Bountiful creates factual 
questions, the judgment was improperly granted in this case and 
should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the construction of public improvements, including 
flood control, is a laudatory and beneficial endeavor, the state 
should be required to pay the just cost of such improvements. Such 
cost includes damages to individuals injured by the construction 
of the improvement. As Justice Holmes warned, "We are in danger 
of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public 
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condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a 
shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change." 
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). 
Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, Farmers 
requests the following relief: 
1. A ruling that § 63-30-3 creates only qualified immunity for 
damages resulting from the construction of flood control systems, 
or in the alternative, that § 63-30-3 violates article I, § 24 of 
the Utah Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional. 
2. A ruling that Farmers' inverse condemnation claim under 
article I, § 22 of the Utah Constitution be reinstated, with 
instructions that Farmers is entitled to compensation under that 
provision if Farmers proves that the culvert, as deliberately 
designed and constructed, was a substantial cause of the damage to 
the mall, regardless of foreseeability. 
3. A ruling that Farmers1 inverse condemnation claim under the 
Fifth Amendment be reinstated, with instructions that Farmers be 
entitled to compensation if it proves that the construction of the 
culvert resulted in permanent impairment of the mall's value and 
that such impairment was a natural and probable consequence of the 
construction. 
4. A ruling that Farmers1 breach of contract claim be 
reinstated. 
5. A remand of the case to the trial court consistent with the 
foregoing rulings. 
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DATED this IM^ day of May, 1989. 
Jannes L. cnristensen 
Paul D. Newton 
Mark J. Morrise 
PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAILING 
The undersigned, attorney for plaintiff and appellant Farmers 
New World Life Insurance Co., hereby certifies that on May 2kfe, 
1989, he caused the foregoing "Brief of Appellant" to be served on 
all parties to this appeal, by mailing copies thereof by first-
class mail, postage prepaid, on the following: 
Attorneys for Bountiful City 
Allan L. Larson 
Stanley J. Preston 
Robert C. Keller 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Dated: Ai**y 3*,fffl 
James L. Christensen 
Paul D. Newton 
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ADDENDUM 
[This addendum is consecutively numbered, with page numbers 
at the top center of each page. The record numbers appear in the 
lower corner of the page.] 
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1001 
James L. Christensen, USB No. A0639 
Paul D. Newton, USB No. 4382 
Mark J. Morrise, USB No. 3840 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
215 South State Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 534-0909 
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PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
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1. Farmers New World Life Insurance Company ("Farmers"), 
is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the 
State of Washington. 
2. Bountiful City is a municipal corporation of the State 
of Utah and is located in Davis County, State of Utah. 
3. McNeil Construction is a Utah corporation with its 
principal place of business in Davis County, State of Utah, 
4. Interwest Construction is a Utah corporation with its 
principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
5. Sharp, Sorensen and Associates, fka Sharp/Pinegar & 
Associates, is a Utah corporation with its principal place of 
business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
6. Fashion Village Shopping Center is a Utah limited 
partnership registered with the Davis County Clerk, State of 
Utah. 
7. The Fashion Village Group is a limited partnership 
registered with the Davis County Clerk, State of Utah. 
8. Merrill W. Beck is an individual residing in Davis 
County, State of Utah. 
9. William W. Compton is believed to be an individual 
residing in Davis County, State of Utah. 
10 • John Does 1 through 5 are unknown persons or entities 
who Farmers shall join in this action once it learns of their 
identities. 
11. The acts that are the subject of this dispute occurred 
in Davis County, State of Utah. 
3 
•VOOO'l 
12. Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Section 78-3-4 of 
Utah Code Annotated. 
13. Venue is proper pursuant to Sections 78-13-1(1) and 78-
13-7 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
A. Construction of Building. 
14. On or about April 28, 1977, the architect, Sharp, 
Sorensen & Associates, prepared the original plans and drawings 
("Plans") for the construction of a commercial building upon real 
property located at approximately 500 South 200 West, Bountiful, 
Utah, which property was owned by Merrill W. Beck and William 
Compton. 
15. Merrill W. Beck and William Compton (the "Developers") 
employed Interwest Construction to build a commercial building 
pursuant to the Plans. 
16. Thereafter, Interwest Construction built a commercial 
building on the above real property now know as Fifth South Plaza 
fka Fashion Square Village (hereinafter the real property and 
building shall be collectively referred to as "the Mall"). 
17. Several feet from and running parallel to the south 
wall of the Mall is a waterway known as "Mill Creek." 
18. The Plans required Interwest Construction to do, among 
other things, the following: 
a. Install and grout reinforced steel in certain 
cells in the hollow, precast wall panels; 
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b. Install and grout "L" shaped steel dowels into 
these grouted cells and into the floor slab; 
c. Improve the Creek; 
d. Install an outside clean-out for the sewer line at 
the southwest corner of the building. 
19. Upon information and belief and contrary to the Plans, 
Interwest Construction: 
a. Did not install reinforced steel in all of the 
required cells in the wall panels; 
b. Did not grout the reinforced steel in all of the 
required wall panels; 
c. Did not tie dowels into the walls and the floor; 
d. Did not grout the dowels in the wall panels; 
e. Did not improve the channel of Mill Creek; 
f. Did not install an outside clean-out for the sewer 
line at the southwest corner of the building; 
g. Did not perform other matters to be discovered 
during the pendency of this litigation. 
20. Trees, vegetation, and foliage were growing between the 
north bank of Mill Creek and the south wall of the Mall 
stabilized the soil between the Mall and Mill Creek. 
B. Transfer of Ownership of Mall. 
21. From about July 11, 1977 through September 11, 1979, 
Merrill W. Beck and William Compton conveyed the Mall to Fashion 
Village Shopping Center, a limited partnership. 
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22. On or about September 11, 1979, Fashion Village 
Shopping Center, a limited partnership, conveyed the Mall to The 
Fashion Village Group, 
23. On or about January 31, 1980, Farmer's loaned The 
Fashion Village Group $1,450,000.00, secured by a Deed of Trust 
on the Mall. 
24. On or about January 10, 1983, Larry G. Moore, as 
successor trustee under the above Deed of Trust, conveyed title 
to the Mall to Farmers by way of a Trustee's Deed. 
C. Construction of Culvert. 
25 o On or about March 29, 1973, Grea Dick Corporation 
conveyed to Bountiful City a perpetual right-of-way and easement 
for any and all city, municipal, and utility purposes over a 
portion of the Mall. 
26. On or about October 16, 1975, Valley Corporation 
conveyed to Bountiful City a perpetual right-of-way and easement 
for the use of utility lines and creek maintenance across a 
portion of the Mall. 
27. On or about October 17, 1985, Farmers, at the request 
of Bountiful City, executed a right-of-way agreement for a creek 
easement, which agreement conveyed to Bountiful City "a perpetual 
right-of-way and easement for the purpose of digging, laying 
concrete, connecting to and maintaining, cleaning and operation 
[sic] a creek drainage facility". 
28. Upon information and belief, prior to October 17, 1985, 
Bountiful City had acquired a prescriptive right-of-way and 
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easement over Mill Creek for the purpose of maintaining, 
operating, repairing, improving, and replacing the same. 
29. During the fall of 1985, Bountiful City advertised for 
and took bids from various contractors for the construction of a 
culvert and/or concrete channel lining ("Culvert") in Mill Creek. 
The segment of Mill Creek's channel to be lined included the 
entire segment adjacent to the south wall of the Mall. 
30. After receiving bids, Bountiful City awarded the 
Culvert project to McNeil Construction. 
31. By the construction contract for the Culvert project, 
Bountiful City required McNeil Construction to do, among other 
things, the following: 
a. To shore up, brace, underpin, sheet, and protect 
as may be necessary all foundations and other parts of all 
existing structures adjacent and adjoining the side of the 
project, which are in any way affected by the excavations or 
other operations connected with the completion of the work 
under the contract; 
b. To indemnify Bountiful City for any damages caused 
from the loss of lateral support of adjoining property and 
consequent damages to adjacent structures; 
c. To provide immediate, adequate protective 
construction, or to reinforce any shoring, bracing or 
sheeting as required by the engineer of Bountiful City; 




e. To avoid use of broken concrete asphalt, used 
reinforcing steel, and other rubble and debris as backfill; 
f. To scarify the fill area to a depth of six inches 
compacted to a specified density and in a specified manner; 
g. To grade the site work area. by hand to specified 
elevations, slopes and contours to effectuate proper 
drainage; 
h. To use trench digging machines only if they will 
not cause damage to structures above or below the ground. 
32. Before the commencement of the construction of the 
Culvert project, the entire south wall of the Mall extended 
several feet below the surface of the adjacent soil. This soil, 
which formed the north embankment to Mill Creek, provided 
important subjacent lateral support to the exterior of the south 
wall by offsetting interior lateral pressure from backfill inside 
the wall. 
33. Contrary to the construction contract for the Culvert 
project, McNeil Construction: 
a. Did not install bracing or shoring to support the 
Mall after excavating and removing the soil between Mill 
Creek and the south wall of the Mall; 
b. Diverted water from Mill Creek directly next to 
and against the building; 




d* Did not compact soil used as backfill to required 
density and in specified manner; 
e. Did not grade the site work areas to specified 
elevations, slopes, and contours; 
f. Used trench digging machines which damaged the 
Mall. 
34. The water which McNeil Construction diverted from Mill 
Creek directly against the south wall of the Mall seeped through 
spaces between the wall's concrete panels and caused "hydro 
compacting" of the fill material inside the wall and underneath 
the floor. 
35. Prior to the soil adjacent to the south wall of the 
Mall being replaced, Farmers discovered damage to the Mall 
structure caused by removal of lateral support to the south wall 
and diversion of Mill Creek directly against the Mall's south 
wall. This damage included cracks in the south wall and adjacent 
floor, tilting of wall panels, holes in the wall panels, and 
undue structural stress throughout the building, which may 
continue to occur. 
36. Only after Farmers had made several demands upon 
Bountiful City did McNeil Construction place backfill between the 
Culvert and the south wall of the Mall. 
37. The new backfill provided much less lateral support 
than the original soil adjacent to the south wall because the 
amount of new backfill was less than the original amount of soil, 
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was of poor grade, and was without significant density or 
compaction* 
38. Due to the acts or omissions of one or more of the 
defendants, the fill under the floors in the Mall has recently 
settled, leaving a void between the floor slab and the fill, thus 
changing the slope of the main sewer drain and separating 
individual unit pipes from the main drainage. Raw sewage and 
water has flowed into the soil instead of the main drain, and use 
of restroom facilities for certain tenants in the Mall has been 
disrupted. 
39. Farmers has been damaged by the acts or failure to act 
by one or more of the defendants, which damages include, but are 
not limited to: (1) loss of income; (2) diminution in value of 
the Mall; and (3) cost of repair to the Mall's roof, floors, 
walls, plumbing, sewer, and fill; and, but not limited to 
reclamation of vegetation behind the south wall of the Mall. 
40. Farmers has given notice of most of the defects to all 
the known Defendants; and not one has offered to remedy them. 
41. Farmers also has satisfied the notice requirements of 
§§63-30-11 and 63-30-13 of Utah Code Annotated. 
42. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §63-30-14, the claim 
submitted to Bountiful City is deemed denied because Bountiful 
City or its insurance carrier has failed to approve or deny the 
claim. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence - McNeil Construction) 
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43. This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through 
42 as though fully set forth herein. 
44. By virtue of the contract between Bountiful City and 
McNeil Construction, McNeil Construction agreed to perform the 
details of the contract, especially in regard to the method, 
means and manner of shoring and bracing adjacent foundations, 
walls and structures. 
45. In performing the excavation and construction work 
adjacent to the Mall, McNeil Construction owed Farmers a duty of 
reasonable care to not damage or injure the Mall. 
46. McNeil Construction failed to exercise reasonable care 
in the manner in which it excavated the area adjacent to the Mall 
by, among other things, removing almost all the soil adjacent to 
the south wall, failing to shore up and brace the south wall, 
diverting Mill Creek directly against the Mall's south wall, and 
by inadequately replacing the soil adjacent to the south wall. 
47. McNeil Construction's negligence caused damage to the 
Mall and to Farmers. 
48. McNeil Construction is liable in damages to Farmers for 
its negligence. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Trespass - McNeil Construction) 
49. This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through 
42 as though fully set forth herein. 
50. Pursuant to the construction contract between 
Bountiful City and McNeil Construction, McNeil Construction 
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trespassed on Farmer's Mall by entering thereon, removing 
Farmer's soil, failing to shore up and brace the south wall of 
the Mall during construction, diverting water from Mill Creek 
directly against the Mall's soth wall, and inadequately replacing 
the original soil, and otherwise abusing, unreasonably exercising 
and exceeding the rights available to it under the easements in 
favor of Bountiful City, 
51. These trespasses caused damage to and seriously injured 
Farmer's and its Mall. 
52. McNeil Construction is liable to Farmers for damages 
caused by these trespasses. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract - McNeil Construction) 
53. This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through 
42 as though fully set forth herein. 
54. The construction contract for the Culvert between 
Bountiful City and McNeil Construction required McNeil 
Construction to shore up, brace, underpin, sheet, and protect as 
may be necessary all foundations and other parts of all existing 
structures adjacent to and adjoining the site of the Culvert 
construction project. 
55. This contract further required McNeil Construction to 
provide, install, and maintain adequate sheeting and bracing to 
support the sides of banks of excavation. 




57. McNeil Construction breached its contract with 
Bountiful City and with Farmers as a third party beneficiary of 
the contract by failing to provide necessary and adequate 
shoring, bracing, and underpinning as required for the 
foundation, walls, floors, and ceilings for Farmer's building. 
58. McNeil Construction is liable to Farmers for damages 
caused by McNeil Construction's breach of the contract. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Liability for Agent's Acts - Bountiful City) 
59. This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through 
42 as though fully set forth herein. 
60. By virtue of the contract between Bountiful City and 
McNeil Construction, Bountiful City retained the right and 
authority to control the method, means and manner that McNeil 
Construction would perform the details of the contract, 
especially in regard to the method, means and manner of shoring 
and bracing adjacent foundations, walls and structures. 
61. During the construction of the Culvert Project, 
Bountiful City did in fact exercise control over the method, 
means and manner that McNeil Construction performed the details 
of the contract. 
62. By virtue of the control retained and exercised by 
Bountiful City over McNeil Construction, Bountiful City is liable 
for the negligence and trespasses of McNeil Construction in 
performing the construction contract as more fully set forth in 
the First and Second Causes of Action herein. 
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63. Bountiful City is liable in damages to Farmers for 
McNeil Construction's acts of negligence and trespass. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Duty to Prevent Unlawful or Tortious Act - Bountiful City) 
64. This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through 
42 as though fully set forth herein. 
65. The construction work performed by McNeil Construction 
was unlawful and/or tortious in that McNeil Construction 
negligently removed lateral support from the Farmer's Mall, 
failed to provide bracing and shoring, diverted water from Mill 
Creek directly next to the south wall of the Mall, and failed to 
adequately replace the soil and its appurtenances. 
66. Bountiful City had timely notice of McNeil 
Construction's unlawful and/or tortious conduct, but took no 
steps to prevent or remedy that conduct, made no objection to 
acts and omissions of McNeil Construction, and did not notify 
Farmers of such acts and omissions. 
67. Bountiful City has inspected and accepted the work 
performed by McNeil Construction on the Culvert behind Farmers' 
Mall. 
68. Bountiful City is liable to Farmers in damages for its 
failure to prevent, object to, remedy, or notify Farmers of 
McNeil Construction's unlawful or tortious conduct. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligent Hiring of McNeil Construction - Bountiful City) 
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69. This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through 
42 as though fully set forth herein. 
70. In selecting McNeil Construction as its contractor, 
Bountiful City had a duty of due care to Farmers to select a 
competent contractor. 
71. On information and belief, Farmers alleges that McNeil 
Construction was inexperienced in the type of work required by 
the contract and/or had a poor reputation as a contractor at the 
time of its hiring and/or had submitted a bid that was inadequate 
to competently and reasonably complete the work required by the 
construction contract for the Culvert. 
72. Bountiful City knew, should have known, or could 
reasonably have ascertained at the time it hired McNeil 
Construction that McNeil Construction was not sufficiently 
competent or experienced to perform the work required by the 
contract or had submitted an inadequate bid. 
73. Bountiful City failed to select a competent contractor 
to perform the work required by the contract. 
74. McNeil Construction's lack of competence and/or 
inadequate bid caused damage to Farmer's Mall through the removal 
of lateral support, inadequate shoring and bracing, diversion of 
water from Mill Creek, and inadequate replacement of soil. 
75. Bountiful City is liable in damages to Farmers for its 
negligent hiring. 
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Work Dangerous in Absence of Special 
Precautions - Bountiful City) 
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76. This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through 
42 as though fully set forth herein. 
77. Bountiful City employed McNeil Construction to 
construct a Culvert behind the south wall of Farmer's Mall, which 
construction Bountiful City should have recognized as likely to 
create, during its progress, a peculiar risk of physical harm to 
Farmers unless special precautions were taken. 
78. McNeil Construction failed to exercise reasonable care 
to take precautions to guard against the peculiar risk of 
physical harm to Farmer's Mall. 
79. The work performed by McNeil Construction and Bountiful 
City did create physical harm to Farmer's Mall. 
80. Bountiful City is liable to Farmers for damages caused 
by McNeil Construction. 
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Work Withdrawing Lateral Support - Bountiful City) 
81. This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through 
42 as though fully set forth herein. 
82. Bountiful City employed McNeil Construction to do work 
which Bountiful City knew or should have known to be likely to 
withdraw lateral support from the south wall of Farmer's Mall. 
83. McNeil Construction withdrew lateral support from the 
south wall of Farmer's Mall, causing damage to Farmer's Mall. 
84. Bountiful City is liable to Farmers for damages caused 




NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Inverse Condemnation - Bountiful City) 
85. This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through 
42 as though fully set forth herein. 
86. The foreseeable and probable consequence and direct 
result of Bountiful City's contract with McNeil Construction was 
removal of soil from Farmer's property adjacent to the Mall and 
the diversion of water from Mill Creek next to the Mall. 
87. Because Bountiful City was a governmental entity, 
Farmers could not prevent Bountiful City from entering onto its 
land, removing its soil, and diverting water from Mill Creek next 
to its Mall. 
88. The removal of Farmer's soil, diversion of water from 
Mill Creek, and inadequate replacement of soil adjacent to the 
wall caused damage to Farmer's building. 
89. By contracting for and causing performance of the 
above-described work, Bountiful City has taken and damaged 
private property for public use without just compensation in 
violation of the Utah Constitution, Article I, section 22. 
90. Farmers is entitled to just compensation for the 
damages to its property caused by Bountiful City. 
TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract - Bountiful City) 
91. This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through 
42 as though fully set forth herein. 
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92. Bountiful City has entered into several contracts with 
Farmers and its predecessors in interest, whereby Bountiful City 
acquired the right to maintain Mill Creek and to construct a 
Culvert. 
93. By entering into these contracts, Bountiful City 
expressly and implicitly agreed to exercise its contractual 
rights fairly and in good faith and workmanlike manner. 
94. Bountiful City, by and through its own and McNeil 
Construction's actons, has disregarded Farmers' right of lateral 
support and has abused its easement rights. 
95. The manner and the extent by which Bountiful City, by 
and through its own and McNeil Construction's actions, exercised 
its rights under these right-of-way and easement contracts to 
construct the Culvert Project, were arbitary and capricious and 
constitute a breach of Bountiful City's contract with Farmers to 
exercise Bountiful's contractual rights fairly and in good faith. 
96. Bountiful City's breach of contract has damaged 
Farmers. 
97. Bountiful City is liable in damages to Farmers for the 
defects and damages. 
ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligent Construction - Interwest Construction 
and John Does 1 through 5) 
98. This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through 
42 as though fully set forth herein. 
99. Interwest Construction is the general contractor who 
originally constructed the Mall. 
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100. John Does 1 through 5 are subcontractors who worked 
under Interwest Construction on the construction of the Mall. 
101. Interwest Construction and John Does 1 through 5 had a 
duty of reasonable care to construct the Mall in a workmanlike 
manner, in accordance with the Plans, and in such a way as to 
cause the Mall to be structurally sound. 
102. On information and belief, Farmers alleges that 
Interwest Construction and John Does 1 through 5 breached that 
duty of reasonable care by negligently constructing the Mall in a 
manner that was not workmanlike, that was not in accordance with 
the Plans, that was not structurally sound and that was 
foreseeable to result in damage at the time it was constructed 
and in the future. 
103. The negligent construction by Interwest Construction 
and John Does 1 through 5 has caused damage to the Mall, 
including cracks in the wall and in the floor, structural stress 
on the ceiling and other parts of the building, a tilting of the 
south wall, and other serious structural problems. These 
Defendants' liability for negligent construction extends not only 
to the original buyer of the Mall but also to subsequent owners, 
including Farmers. 
104. These Defendants are liable in damages to Farmers in 
damages. 
TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract - Interwest Construction) 
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105. This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through 
42 as though fully set forth herein. 
106. Upon information and belief, the contract between the 
Developers and Interwest Construction required Interwest 
Construction to construct the building in accordance with the 
Plans. 
107. Farmers is a third party beneficiary of that 
construction contract. 
108. Interwest Construction breached its contract with the 
developers and Farmers as a third party beneficiary by failing to 
perform those duties more particularly described in paragraph 19 
herein. 
109. Accordingly, Interwest Construction is liable in 
damages to Farmers for breach of that contract. 
THIRTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence - Sharp, Sorensen & Associates) 
110. This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through 
42 as though fully set forth herein. 
111. Sharp, Sorensen & Associates designed the Mall and 
prepared the Plans used by Interwest Construction, the general 
contractor, who originally built the Mall. 
112. Upon information and belief, as a professional entity 
involved in the design, preparation of plans and specifications, 
and rendering of other architectural services, with respect to 
desiging the Mall building, Sharp, Sorensen & Associates owes a 
duty of reasonable care in the performing of its professional 
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services, including participation in and supervision of the 
construction of the Mall building• 
113. Sharp, Sorensen & Associates failed to participate in, 
control, supervise, and/or influence the construction of the 
Mall. 
114. The negligence of Sharp, Sorensen & Associates directly 
and proximately caused damage to Farmer's Mall as previously set 
forth in this Complaint. 
115. Sharp, Sorensen & Associates is liable in damages to 
Farmers. 
FOURTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Implied Warranty of Habitability and Fitness - Merrill 
W. Beck, William Compton, Interwest 
Construction, Fashion Village Shopping Center, 
and The Fashion Village Group) 
116. This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through 
42 as though fully set forth herein. 
117. Interwest Construction was the general contractor who 
built the Mall. 
118. On information and belief, Farmers alleges that the 
original purchaser of the Mall was a business entity known as the 
Fashion Village Shopping Center in which Merrill W. Beck and 
William Compton were general partners. 
119. On information and belief, Farmers alleges that Merrill 
W. Beck and William Compton were the persons who developed and 
sold the Mall to the Fashion Village Shopping Center. 
120. On information and belief, Farmers alleges that at the 
times Beck and Compton sold the Mall to the original purchaser, 
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the Mall contained hidden and latent defects that the original 
purchaser could not have discovered by a reasonable inspection at 
the time of sale. These defects included, among other things, an 
improper joining of the south wall to the floor and an improper 
placement of backfill inside the building. 
121. The defects manifested themselves during the course of 
construction of the Culvert. 
122. Upon information and belief, the original purchaser was 
unaware of the above-described defects at the time of the sale. 
123. The above-described defects are so serious and affect 
such an integral part of the Mall as to render the Mall 
uninhabitable by the business entities that occupy the Mall and 
unfit for its intended use as a commercial structure. 
124. The above-described defects were caused by the failure 
of the Developers and Interwest Construction to construct the 
Mall in a workmanlike manner, thus, breaching the implied 
warranty of habitability and fitness for intended use applicable 
to the original purchaser. 
125. Farmers is entitled, as a subsequent purchaser of the 
Mall, to rely on the implied warranties of habitability and 
fitness for intended use that apply to the original purchaser. 
126. The Fashion Village Group was the owner of the Mall 
when it pledged it to Farmers as security for the $1,450,000.00 
loan. 
127. At the time that The Fashion Village Group conveyed the 
Mall to Farmers by the Deed of Trust, Fashion Village Group 
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either expressly or impliedly warranted that the Mall would be 
free from the types of damage and structural defects previously 
described in this complaint. 
128. The Fashion Village Group failed to disclose to Farmers 
the existence of such damage and structural defects. 
129. Farmers relied on the express or implied warranties in 
the Deed of Trust that the Mall would be free from such 
structural and other defects, and was unaware of those defects at 
the time of the loan and subsequent foreclosure. 
130. The above-described defects and breach of implied and 
express warranties have damaged Farmers. 
131. Merrill W. Beck, William Compton, Interwest 
Construction, Fashion Village Shopping Center, and The Fashion 
Village Group are liable in damages to Farmers for these defects. 
PRAYER 
Plaintiff prays for the following relief: 
1. For judgment in an amount not yet determined against 
all Defendants for all damages caused by these Defendants, 
including compensatory and consequential damages. 
2. For all reasonable costs in bringing this action, 
including costs of court and reasonable attorney's fees. 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems 
just and proper. 
23 
000024 
DATED this Qcr day of April, 1987. 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
W^Wiv 
James L. Christensen 
Paul D. Newton 
Mark J. Morrise 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's Address: 
Farmers New World Life Insurance 
4680 Wilshire Boulevard 
Los Angeles, CA 90010 
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ALLAN L. LARSON 
STANLEY J. PRESTON 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Bountiful City 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




BOUNTIFUL CITY; McNEIL CON-
STRUCTION; SHARP, SORENSEN AND 
ASSOCIATES; INTERWEST CONSTRUC 
TION; FASHION VILLAGE SHOPPING 
CENTER, a partnership; THE 
FASHION VILLAGE GROUP; MERRILL 
W. BECK; WILLIAM COMPTON; and 
JOHN DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
JACK P. BALLING, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: 
1. I am a resident of the State of Utah and a citizen of 
the United States, over the age of 21 years. I have personal 
knowledge of the matters set forth herein. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JACK P. 
BALLING, BOUNTIFUL CITY 
ENGINEER 
Civil No. 41340 
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2. I am presently employed as the City Engineer for 
Bountiful, Utah, and have been so employed for the past 20 
years. 
3. In 1983, there was substantial flooding in Davis 
County, including Bountiful City. Fashion Village Mall in 
Bountiful City was affected by the 1983 flooding when Mill 
Creek, a natural water channel which runs adjacent to the Mall 
and which collects and transports flood and storm water from 
the surrounding area, flooded and washed out earthen banks of 
the creek adjacent to the Mall and deposited substantial 
amounts of debris up against the south wall of the Mall 
building. After the 1983 flood waters receded, the owners of 
the Mall requested that Bountiful City rechannel Mill Creek and 
install a concrete channel to avoid future flooding. 
4. Bountiful City responded to that request by informing 
Mall owners that the City would include that proposed project 
in its flood control construction plans, but that other more 
pressing flood control problems needed to be remedied before 
the Mill Creek problem at Fashion Village Mall could be 
addressed. 
5. During the fall of 1985, Bountiful City decided to 
install a concrete channel lining for Mill Creek at the Fashion 
Village Mall location. Bountiful City submitted plans for the 
project to Davis County for approval by Davis County Flood 
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Control. Davis County approved the plans as submitted by 
Bountiful City. Davis County also gave authorization to 
Bountiful City to proceed with the project and to use County 
funds to pay for the project, pursuant to the Flood Control 
Ordinance of Davis County. 
6. Bountiful City let bids on the project and the 
contract was eventually awarded to McNeil Construction Company, 
who signed a contract for this construction project on 
February 27, 1986. A copy of the construction contract is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A." 
7. Under the terms of the construction contract mentioned 
in the paragraph next above, the concrete channel to be 
constructed by McNeil Construction Company for Mill Creek was 
to be set at the same elevation as the natural bed of the creek 
prior to construction. McNeil Construction Company did have 
discretion, however, in the manner in which the creek would be 
diverted from its natural channel while the new concrete 
channel was being constructed. McNeil Construction decided to 
divert the creek next to the south wall of the Mall while it 
constructed the concrete channel contracted for. 
8. The construction project let to McNeil Construction 
Company was for the exclusive purpose of improving the flood 
control capabilities of Mill Creek within Bountiful City, and 
particularly at the location of the Fashion Village Mall. The 
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control capabilities of Mill Creek within Bountiful City, and 
particularly at the location of the Fashion Village Mall. The 
project was also undertaken, at least in part, as a result of 
the specific request for flood control improvements to Mill 
Creek by the Mall owners, made following the flooding of 1983. 
9. The Mill Creek improvement project hereinabove 
described is an integral part of Bountiful City's flood and 
storm system, used to collect and transport excess flood and 
storm waters. 
Further affiant saith not. 
DATED this 2$" day of January, 1988. 
^ r»*U?. Q^sb?^ 
J.ack P. Balling 
I 1 
" \ 
t SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s 2 7 day of 
January, . -1988. 
wonary F U D H C ;?
 fc . , 
R e s i d i n g a t %&/>/+Ad /luJ{ 
or-0029 
ALLAN L. LARSON (A1896) 
STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Bountiful City 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FARMERS NEW WORLD LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
AFFIDAVIT OF SID SMITH, 
DAVIS COUNTY FLOOD 
DIRECTOR 
V. 
BOUNTIFUL CITY, McNEIL 
CONSTRUCTION, SHARP SORENSEN 
AND ASSOCIATES, INTERWEST 
CONSTRUCTION, FASHION VILLAGE 
SHOPPING CENTER, a partnership 
THE FASHION VILLAGE GROUP, 
MERRILL W. BECK, WILLIAM 
COMPTON, and JOHN DOES 1 
through 5, 
Civil No. 41340 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) ss: 
Sid Smith, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and 
says: 
1. Affiant is a resident of the State of Utah and a 
citizen of the United States, over the age of 21 years, and has 
personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein. 
2. On April 24, 1985 Davis County entered into an 
agreement with Bountiful City whereby Bountiful City would design 
and construct various flood control projects and Davis County 
would fund 50% (fifty per cent) of the actual costs of the 
projects, but not to exceed $3 57,500-00. 
3. Included in the agreement dated April 24, 1985 was a 
flood control improvement project involving Milcreek at or near 
the south wall of the Fashion Village Mall in Bountiful, Utah. 
4. There had been flooding in many spots along the 
Milcreek channel in 1983, including the area near the south wall 
of the Fashion Village Mall in Bountiful, Utah. 
5. Bountiful City represented to Davis County that the 
project being designed and constructed by Bountiful City would 
improve the flood control capabilities of Milcreek at many 
locations, including the location in question. 
6. Bountiful City designed and constructed the 
improvements along Milcreek, and flood control funds from Davis 
County as well as State disaster relief funds were made available 
to Bountiful City for the project. 
7. At the time the project was initiated by Bountiful 
City, Davis County did not have a flood control ordinance but 
each city was responsible for the flood control channels within 
the jurisdiction of each. 
Further, affiant sayeth not. 
Dated this 3/ day of May, 1988. MJ




Subscribed and sworn to before me this O/ day of 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires: Residing a t : 
4L £ t?te 
OPQ032 
ALLAN L. LARSON 
STANLEY J. PRESTON 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Bountiful City 
10 Exchange Places Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
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BOUNTIFUL CITY; MCNEIL 
CONSTRUCTION; SHARP, SORENSEN 
AND ASSOCIATES; INTERWEST 
CONSTRUCTION; FASHION VILLAGE 
SHOPPING CENTER, a partnership; 
THE FASHION VILLAGE GROUP; 
MERRILL W. BECK; WILLIAM 
COMPTON; and JOHN DOES 1 
through 5, 
Defendants. 
BOUNTIFUL CITY'S REPLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 41340 
Defendant Bountiful City (the "City") submits the following 
reply memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The City responds to the arguments set forth in plaintiff's 
opposing Memorandum by making the following points: 
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1. Plaintiff does not dispute the underlying facts which 
establish that the project in question was a flood control 
project within the meaning of § 63-30-3 of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act ("UGIA"). 
2. In its 1984 Budget Session, the Utah Legislature 
passed a "Flood Relief" bill adding a second paragraph to 
§ 63-30-3. This Amendment by its express terms grants absolute 
immunity to flood control projects. Plaintiff fails to cite, 
nor is the City aware of, a single case in Utah in the last 
four years since this Amendment was passed, which has held that 
flood control projects are entitled only to qualified immun-
ity. To the contrary, every case in Utah which has dealt with 
this issue, to the City's knowledge, has held that this 
Amendment grants absolute immunity to flood control projects. 
Accordingly, the City is entitled to summary judgment in this 
action. 
3. As a separate ground for summary judgment, plaintiff's 
inverse condemnation action fails for the following reasons: 
(a) There is, plainly and unequivocally, in the State 
of Utah, no cause of action arising under the bare language of 
Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution. 
(b) That clause does not, in any event, permit suits 




(c) The 1987 enactment known as § 63-30-10.5, 
paralleling as it does Article I, Section 22 of the 
Constitution, carries the same meaning and effect as the 
constitutional section, and is therefore limited to actions 
referable to a government's power of eminent domain. It cannot 
provide a basis for actions based upon tortious conduct. This 
meaning is further clarified by the reference in that section 
to Utah's Eminent Domain Law. 
(d) The 1987 enactment of §63-30-10.5 cannot be 
retroactively applied. 
(e) Plaintiff's reliance on an inverse condemnation 
claim under the federal constitution is inappropriate because 
no such claim is currently contained in plaintiff's complaint. 
In any event, plaintiff has failed to cite any cases which 
stand for the proposition that the Federal Constitution permits 




PLAINTIFF DOES NOT DISPUTE THAT THE PROJECT 
IN QUESTION WAS A FLOOD CONTROL PROJECT 
WITHIN THE MEANING OF § 63-30-3. 
In its original Memorandum, the City set forth in detail 
the facts necessary to establish that the Milcreek construction 
project was a flood control project. The City relied upon the 
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affidavits of Bountiful City Engineer, Jack Balling, and Davis 
County Flood Control Director, Sid Smith. Plaintiff did not 
directly controvert any of these facts in its opposing 
Memorandum. Plaintiff did state that two of the documents 
relied upon the City are unsupported by Affidavit and therefore 
cannot be used to support the City's position. 
The City submits that the flood control nature of this 
project can be established independent of the two documents in 
question. In any event, to the extent these documents must be 
supported by affidavit, the City has cured the questions raised 
by plaintiff by submitting the Supplemental Affidavit of Jack 
Balling, filed concurrently herewith, which verifies the two 
documents in question. Thus, all of the facts relied upon by 
Bountiful City in its original Memorandum are undisputed by 
plaintiff. These facts establish without question that the 
Milcreek construction project was a flood control project 
within the meaning of § 63-30-3. 
II. 
SECTION 63-30-3 OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT, AS AMENDED, GRANTS THE CITY 
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FOR ITS CONSTRUCTION, 
REPAIR AND OPERATION OF FLOOD AND STORM 
SYSTEMS. 
During its 1984 Budget Session, the Utah Legislature passed 
a "Flood Relief" bill that contained an amendment to § 63-30-3 
of the UGIA. As the City noted in its original Memorandum, 
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this Amendment added a second paragraph to § 63-30-3, which 
reads as follows: 
The management of flood waters and the construction, 
repair and operation of flood and storm systems by 
governmental entities are considered to be govern-
mental functions, and governmental entities and their 
officers and employees are immune from suit from any 
injury or damage resulting from those activities. 
In enacting the 1984 Amendment to § 63-30-3, the Utah 
Legislature was responding to the severe flood problems which 
began in the spring of 1983, and which caused Governor Matheson 
to declare a state of emergency. The State of Utah and its 
political subdivisions then responded by commencing extraordi-
nary efforts to prevent flood damage and to ensure the public 
safety. The language used by the Legislature in § 63-30-3 
could not be any more certain or unambiguous. The intent is 
clearly to preserve sovereign immunity from suit for any injury 
or damage resulting from the management of flood waters and the 
construction, repair and operation of flood and storm systems 
by governmental entities. 
In its original Memorandum, the City discussed the appli-
cable law interpreting the construction of Utah statutes which 
establishes that this Amendment grants absolute immunity for 
flood control projects. Without citing any case law in support 
of its analysis, plaintiff would have this court interpret the 
Amendment so as to grant only qualified immunity to flood 
control projects. Such an interpretation renders meaningless 
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the last phrase of the amended paragraph wherein the Utah 
Legislature stated that "governmental entities and their 
officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or 
damage resulting from those activities." 
The interpretation advanced by the City has been univer-
sally accepted by the Utah District Courts which have repeat-
edly ruled on this issue during the four years since the 1984 
Amendment was passed. Plaintiff has failed to cite a single 
case agreeing with plaintiff's "qualified immunity" interpre-
tation of the Amendment. To the City's knowledge, no Utah 
District Court has ever so held. In its original Memorandum, 
the City attached the rulings of thirteen (13) separate 
District: Court Judges in the Second, Third, and Fourth District 
Courts in the State of Utah which have all held that this 
Amendment grants absolute immunity to flood control projects. 
Since the filing of its original Memorandum, the City has 
learned that three (3) other District Court Judges have also 
held that the Amendment grants absolute immunity. See Williams 
v. Carbon County Board of Education, Civil No. 15187, (7th 
District Court of Utah, June 15, 1987) (the Hon. Boyd Bunell, 
Judge); Hansen v. Salt Lake County (3d District Court of Utah, 
October 22, 1985) (the Hon. Dean E. Conder, Judge); and Irvin 
v. Salt Lake County, (3d District Court of Utah) (the Hon. 
David B. Dee, Judge); 
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Based upon this great weight of authority, the City submits 
that its interpretation of the 1984 Amendment to § 63-30-3 is 
the correct one. 
Significantly, the 1984 Amendment gave statutory expression 
to the common law principle that the sovereign has full immun-
ity from suit for the management of flood waters. This princi-
pal of law was established in Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 
134 P. 626 (1913), which held that the sovereign was immune in 
a situation where the plaintiff claimed damages resulting from 
the State's actions and construction of a flume, or culvert and 
undershot, for the purpose of protecting a canal against flood 
water, i.e., the construction and operation of a storm and 
flood system. Subsequently, governmental entities were still 
held by the Utah Supreme Court to be immune from suit in cases 
involving flood control or flood systems. See e.g., McKell v. 
Spanish Fork City, 305 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1957). The 1984 
Amendment merely clarified or amplified that rule of law to 
insure that the principle remain intact under the statutory 
framework of the UGIA. 
In its opposing Memorandum, plaintiff argues that the immun-
ity granted flood control projects under 1984 Amendment is 
waived by § 63-30-5 (waiver for contractual obligations), 
§ 63-30-7 (waiver for defective structures), § 63-30-10 (waiver 
for injury caused by the negligence of an employee), and 
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§ 63-30-10.5 (waiver for inverse condemnation). To the 
contrary, it is clear that the Utah Legislature's specific 
grant of immunity contained in § 63-30-3 for flood control 
activities supersedes the general waiver of immunity contained 
in § 63-30-5, -7, -10 and -10.5. As a result of the 
Legislature's grant of absolute immunity, application of any 
expressed waivers of immunity are barred. These waivers are 
applicable only where the qualified immunity of the first 
paragraph § 63-30-3 attaches. Again, this is the interpre-
tation supported by the holdings of the numerous Utah District 
Court cases cited by the City. Thus, because § 63-30-3 grants 
absolute immunity to flood control projects, plaintiff's 
complaint against the City fails in its entirety and the Court 
need not concern itself with the other arguments advanced in 
plaintiff's opposing Memorandum. 
Before leaving this point, the City does note that plain-
tiff's breach of contract claim is particulary weak. This 
claim is based upon a Right-of-Way Agreement, copies of which 
were attached to both the City's and plaintiff's original 
Memoranda. A review of this document, however, reveals that it 
is nothing more than an easement granted by the plaintiff to 
the City to perform the very flood control work which plaintiff 
had previously requested. It is not a contract between the 
parties. Under the express terms of this easement, the City 
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has no obligations. In fact, the document is not even signed 
by the City. More importantly, the claims made by the plain-
tiff against the City sound in tort, specifically negligence, 
not breach of contract. Plaintiff's strained analysis cannot 
hide this point. In addition, all the Utah cases cited by 
plaintiff in support of the breach of contract claim are 
distinguishable from the present case. The cases cited all 
involved written contracts between the parties, where the 
governmental entities had express obligations under the term of 
the contracts. None involved easements. In any event, the 
issue is moot given the absolute immunity granted by the 1984 
Amended to § 63-30-3. 
III. 
THERE IS NO INVERSE CONDEMNATION ACTION FOR 
NEGLIGENTLY TORTIOUS CONDUCT IN THE STATE OF 
UTAH. 
Plaintiff goes to considerable length to set forth its 
position that it can assert an action for inverse condemnation 
under the facts of this case. Though the City maintains that 
the point is moot given the absolute immunity of § 63-30-3, it 
nonetheless addresses this issue as a separate ground for 
granting summary judgment on the inverse condemnation claim. 
Contrary to plaintiff's labored analysis, Utah case law clearly 
establishes that inverse condemnation under the facts of this 
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case is not actionable. Specifically, the Utah Supreme Court 
has held that Article I, § 22 of the Utah Constitution is not 
self executing. 
The Utah case law on this issue is stated in the opinions 
of Utah Supreme Court Justices Henriod and Wade. Their 
opinions, concurring opinions, dissents, rebuttals, etc., in 
Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 349 P.2d 157 (Utah 1960); 
Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 354 P.2d 105 (Utah 1960); and 
State Road Commission v. Parker, 368 P.2d 585 (Utah 1962) 
firmly establish the application and meaning of Article I, 
Section 22 of Utah's Constitution. Justice Henroid's view was 
upheld by the Utah Supreme Court. When Justice Wade was in 
dissent, he was alone. The Court's position is, without 
qualification, equivocation, or condition, that sovereign 
immunity protects governmental entities in the State of Utah 
from suits brought for the purpose of obtaining compensation 
for the taking or damaging of private property for public use; 
and that Article I, Section 22 cf the Utah Constitution is not 
self-executing so as to constitute a waiver of that immunity. 
Further, the cases clearly set forth the rule that consent for 
the state (governmental entities) to be sued is a legislative 
matter, and will not be created nor inferred by the courts. 
These holdings were based upon the precedents of Wilkinson 
v. State, 134 Pac. 626 (Utah 1913); Campbell Building Co. v. 
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State Road Commission, 70 P.2d 857 (Utah 1937); State v State 
Road Commission v. District Court/ Fourth Judicial District, 
78 P.2d 502 (Utah 1937); Bingham v. Board of Education, 223 
p.2d 432 (Utah 1950); Hjorth v. Whittenberg, 241 P.2d 907 (Utah 
1952); These holdings continued, without any change whatsoever, 
up to the passage by the Legislature of the Governmental 
Immunity Act (§ 63-30-1 et seq., Utah Code, 1953). See Hurst 
v. Highway Department, 397 P.2d 71 (Utah 1964); and Sine v 
Helland, 418 P.2d 979 (Utah 1966). The UGIA then "substituted 
a statutory framework" for the common law of sovereign immunity 
existing prior thereto in the State, "to be interpreted by the 
courts and reshaped by the Legislature as necessary from time 
to time." Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983), 629-630. 
Upon its enactment in 1965, this statutory framework for 
governmental immunity did not provide consent for the sovereign 
to be sued for "taking" or "damaging" private property for 
public use. The Act retained sovereign immunity, except as 
waived therein. (§ 63-30-3, Utah Code, 1953). As a result, 
the Utah Supreme Court found no basis in the UGIA to permit a 
suit pursuant to Article I, Section 22. In Holt v. Utah State 
Road Commission, 522 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1973), the Court stated, 
The law has long been established in this State that 
under (the claim of- taking of property without compen-
sation) there can be no recovery from the State for 
damages . . . . Sufficient has been said as to the 
pro and con of this subject that we think it unneces-
sary and undesirable to extenuate thereon, but refer 
to the adjudicated cases. 
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The Court's reference is to the following cases: State v. 
Fourth District Court, supra; Hjorth v. Whittenberg, supra; 
Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, supra; Springville Banking Co. 
v. Burton, supra; State v. Parker, supra; and Anderson 
Investment Corp. v. State of Utah, 503 P.2d 144 (Utah 1972). 
In deciding Holt, the Court guoted the language of § 63-30-3, 
"Except as may be otherwise provided in this act . . . for any 
injury which may result from . . . the exercise . . . of a 
governmental function" to indicate the legislature's intention 
that the Act be strictly construed to preserve sovereign 
immunity and to waive it only as clearly expressed therein. 
Holt, supra, at 1287-1288. 
It is thus clear that the Utah Supreme Court has never 
recognized Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution as a 
waiver of sovereign immunity. No doubt many have chafed, and 
my chafe, under this fact. Many may think it is bad law, old-
fashioned law, harsh law, etc. However those thoughts have all 
been expressed to the Utah Supreme Court, and the Court has 
rejected all such claims to steadfastly hold to the principle 
that governments are immune from suit until and unless immunity 
is waived by the legislature. The arguments, pro and con, are 
well covered in the Springville Banking, Fairclough, and Parker 
cases cited above. Particularly appropos to the argument 
against plaintiff's position is the language of Justice Henroid 
in Springville Banking, at 171: 
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The doctrine of stare decisis and the solemn pronounce-
ments of this court stretching over a period of nearly 
half a century, and authored by such respected 
justices as Justice Frick in the Wilkinson case, Judge 
Hoyt in the Fourth District case, and Justice Folland 
in the Campbell case, not to mention the innumerable 
other justices who have on many, many occasions said 
that the sovereign could not be sued under a 
constitutional provision that says "private property 
shall not be taken for public use without just 
compensation" should not be treated as lightly as 
Justice Wade treats them by seeking cases from other 
jurisdictions to gather strange constitutional provi-
sions which are strangely different from our own in 
order to construe a constitutional provision that we 
have construed four or five times. 
Further, in Parker, supra, at p. 589, Justice Henroid 
remarked, "Advocacy for a personally desired result is a poor 
substitute for stare decisis, or for the emasculation of 
legislation which has been interpreted time and again by this 
court • . . ." 
Thus, there is absolutely no basis for plaintiff in this 
case to seek or obtain recovery from Bountiful City pursuant to 
Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution. 
Plaintiff also contends that the 1987 enactment of 
§ 63-30-10.5 now authorizes the maintenance of a suit for the 
"taking" or "damage" of private property for public use without 
just compensation. The City concurs that such a suit may be 
brought if the Legislature has enacted appropriate enabling 
legislation. In the instant case however, the said 
§ 63-30-10.5 is of no avail to plaintiff for two reasons: (1) 
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The statute gives rise to a new cause of action which did not 
exist prior to 1987, and (2) the statute does not contemplate 
suits sounding in tort, or negligence. 
The principles relating to retroactive application of laws 
enacted by the Legislature are settled. As stated in Okland 
Construction Company v. Industrial Commission, 520 P.2d 108 
(Utah 1974), a later statute or amendment should not be applied 
in a retroactive manner to deprive a party of his rights or 
impose a greater liability upon him; however, that principle 
has no application when the later statute or amendment deals 
only with a clarification or amplification as to how the law 
should have been understood prior to its enactment. This Court 
stated in Carlucci v. Utah State Industrial Commission, 725 
P.2d 1335 (Utah 1986) , 
(T)he law establishing substantive rights and liabil-
ities when a cause of action arises, and not a subse-
quently enacted statute, governs the resolution of a 
dispute . . . . (H)owever . . . statutes which are 
procedural only and do not create, alter, or destroy 
substantive rights may be applied to courses of action 
that: have accrued or are pending at the time the 
statute is enacted, (emphasis added). 
In the instant case, prior to 1987, sovereign immunity 
barred a suit against a governmental entity for recovery of 
compensation or the "taking" or "damaging" of private property 
for public use. The 1987 enactment of § 63-30-10.5 created a 
substantive right which theretofore had not existed. Thus, it 
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should not be applied retroactively to this case, where the 
project in question was undertaken in 1985, two years before 
this amendment. 
Secondly, in a proper case for application of § 63-30-10.5, 
it is clear that the act is meant to cover only those "takings" 
or "damagings" occurring pursuant to the sovereign power of 
eminent domain. This is evident from the wording of the sta-
tute, being nearly identical to Article I, Section 22 of the 
Utah Constitution; by its inclusion, by reference, of the Utah 
Eminent Domain law as the basis whereby compensation shall be 
assessed; and by its placement within the framework of the UGIA. 
A generalized reference to "taking" or "damage" cases 
arising under state constitutional clauses similar to Utah's 
Article I, Section 22, reveals a completely bewildering maze of 
decisions which reflect either the eagerness or restraint of 
courts in other jurisdictions in using such clauses as a means 
of circumventing sovereign immunity. One scholar has stated 
that inverse condemnation law is an "artificiality" created 
largely to evade sovereign immunity. Van Alstyne, "Inverse 
Condemnation: Unintended Physical Damage," 20 Hastings L.J./ 
431, 515 (1969). As shown herein, the Utah Supreme Court 
refused steadfastly to allow such an artificiality to develop. 
The question now is, does § 63-30-10.5 of the UGIA permit 
this court to now enter into that "artificiality" of inverse 
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condemnation law which swallows up governmental immunity 
through an interpretation that says, in effect, that any time a 
governmental entity performs any function, and property is 
damaged in the process, no matter how, when or why the damage 
occurs, there has been a "taking" or "damage" requiring "just 
compensation?" 
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should not 
take such an approach. The history of inverse condemnation law 
in this state has already been traced herein. And, it is perti-
nent to note that even Justice Wade, who contended hardest for 
allowance of a suit in inverse condemnation, would not permit 
it to extend to cases sounding in tort or negligence. In his 
concurring opinion in Springville Banking, Justice Wade said, 
at 349 P.2d 157, 166: 
Such compensation must result from or grow out of a 
public use of property, either the property taken or 
other property used for a public purpose . . . . Such 
public use must be one the state is entitled to make, 
and it must be intentionally made by the duly consti-
tuted public officers and not be merely the result of 
negligence or other wrongful acts which create 
ordinary tort liability. (emphasis added). 
In his dissent in Fairclouch, Justice Wade said, at 354 
P.2d 105, 110-111: 
This provision (Article I, Section 22, Utah 
Constitution) clearly requires the taking or damaging 
of tangible private property, and that the public use 
must be intentional and not merely accidental or 
negligently caused. So damages from personal injuries 
or from breach of contract and all damages except from 
an intentional public use are not included in such 
consent . . . . 
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. . . (I)t is generally recognized that accidental or 
negligent injury is not a damage to private property 
for a public use. So that case has no bearing on our 
problem. 
Where the governmental activity complained of was no more 
than negligent performance of public duties and was unrelated 
to any deliberate taking or necessary damaging of appellant's 
property for a public use, and where the damage wrought was not 
a necessary consequence or result of the public undertaking, 
the claim for damages is a claim in tort and should not be 
given constitutional status. See Harris v. United States, 205 
F.2d 765, 767-68 (10th Cir. 1953); Havashi v. Alameda County 
Flood Control and Water Cons. Dist., (67 Cal. App. 2d 584, 334 
P.2d 1048, 1053 (1959); Dallas County Flood Control Dist. v. 
Benson, 157 Tex. 617, 306 S.W. 2d 350, 351 (1957); Chavez v, 
City of Laramie, 359 P.2d 23, 25 (Wyo. 1964). 
In Lund v. Salt Lake County, 200 P. 510 (Utah 1921), 
plaintiff sued to recover damages for injury to certain fish 
ponds and destruction of fish alleged to have resulted from the 
county's flushing of water through a reservoir owned and 
controlled by the county, which water entered an overflow ditch 
and eventually reached plaintiff's ponds. Plaintiff's com-
plaint claimed a right of recovery pursuant to Article I, 
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution. The Utah Supreme Court 
rejected this claim without any discussion of sovereign 
-17-
onoo;3 
immunity. The Court said the case must be examined within the 
law regulating the exercise of eminent domain. Fundamental 
principles of that law, said the Court, require that the 
property taken be taken for a public use, that the structure or 
work causing the injury be for a public purpose, that it be 
authorized by law, and that the damage for which compensation 
was claimed be a necessary consequence of the public use. "We 
are clearly of the opinion that the damages for which 
compensation is allowed under Article I, Section 22, of the 
State Constitution are such as are the direct consequences of 
the lawful exercise of the right of eminent domain, and that 
ordinarily such damages are unavoidable." Ld. at 514. 
Section 63-30-10.5 of the UGIA has not enlarged this view 
of the type of "takings" or "damages" for which compensation 
may now be sought. The reference in the statute is to Utah's 
Eminent Domain law for compensation and assessment of damages. 
That entire chapter contemplates payment for the taking and 
damage of private property only for public use that: (1) is 
authorized by law, and (2) is necessary for such public use. 
(§ 78-34-4). There is nothing in the chapter to expand 
§ 63-30-10.5 into a basis for recovery of compensation result-
ing from negligent or accidental "taking" or "damage". Thus 
§ 63-30-10.5 should be construed as Justice Wade would have 
construed Article I, Section 22, and as did the Court in Lund 
v. Salt Lake County, supra. 
-18-
0P0050 
It is clear, therefore, that there is no Utah precedent 
which would now push this court into the "artificiality" of 
inverse condemnation law as it has developed in other juris-
dictions as a means to evade sovereign immunity. In fact, it 
is clear that prior Justices of the Utah Supreme Court, as well 
as the Legislature which enacted § 63-30-10.5, intended that 
inverse condemnation not apply to damages arising from negli-
gence, accident, unlawful or unauthorized acts, or which are 
not the intended consequence of lawful and authorized takings 
of property for public use. Section 63-30-10.5 merely takes 
its place within the statutory framework of sovereign immunity 
provided by the UGIA. That section waives immunity only in 
that limited area of "takings" or "damagings" arising out of 
the lawful exercise of eminent domain power. In all other 
areas of governmental activity, governmental immunity is 
determined by other relevant provisions of the UGIA. By thus 
applying § 63-30-10.5 as a part of the overall framework of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, this court will not be caught 
up in the confusion and injustice which arises from the mixture 
of inverse and tort liabilities of governments. See Van 
Alstyne, supra, at 508. 
Finally, in its opposing Memorandum plaintiff asserts that 
it has a claim for inverse condemnation under United States 
Constitution. Significantly no such claim is currently 
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contained in plaintiff's complaint. The fact that plaintiff is 
trying to amend his complaint to add such a claim is not a 
defense to the City's Summary Judgment Motion where permission 
to amend has not been granted. In any event, plaintiff cites 
no authority for the proposition, nor is the City aware of any 
such authority, that the Federal Constitution allows inverse 
condemnation actions for negligently tortious conduct. In 
short, the same reasoning set forth above applies equally to 
the Federal Constitution as to the Utah Constitution. 
Plaintiff does cite the case of First English of Angelico 
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. 
Ct. Rpt. 2378 (1987); however, this case does not support the 
actionability of an inverse condemnation claim under the facts 
of this case. First English was an eminent domain case arising 
out a deliberate, intentional taking. Specifically, it 
involved a claim against a county flood control district 
wherein the landowner asserted that the district's temporary, 
regulatory ordinance prohibiting construction on the land-
owner's property deprived the landowner of all use of its 
property. Obviously, this case does not support the propo-
sition that plaintiff is entitled to file an inverse condem-
nation action based on the alleged negligent actions of the 
City in the construction of a culvert, because there is no 




Based on the foregoing, the City respectively submits it is 
entitled to summary judgment in this action. 
DATED this ^ ^ d a y of August, 1988. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By-
Stanley $y. Preston 
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This is the time set for hearing on a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Mark Maurice is present for the plaintiff and Stan 
Preston and Layne Forbes are present for the defendant. 
Arguments are made by counsel. Court finds that this is an 
action which resulted as a direct response to the flooding in 
1983. Section 63-30-3 was in direct response to the floods which 
section provides that those actions are entitled to governmental 
immunity. Court finds there is no basis for the implied contract 
and Court will grant the motion for summary judgment provided 
that the Court will allow plaintiff 10 days to amend complaint as 
to the Fifth Amendment. Mr. Preston is to prepare the order. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FARMERS NEW WORLD LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
v. 
BOUNTIFUL CITY; MCNEIL 
CONSTRUCTION; SHARP, SORENSEN 
AND ASSOCIATES; FASHION VILLAGE 
SHOPPING CENTER, a partnership; 
THE FASHION VILLAGE GROUP; Civil No. 41340 
MERRILL W. BECK; WILLIAM 
COMPTON; and JOHN DOES 1 
through 5, 
Defendants. 
Defendant Bountiful City's Motion for Summary Judgment 
came on regularly for hearing before the above-entitled Court, 
the Honorable Rodney S. Page presiding, on August 30, 1988. 
Plaintiff was represented by Mark J. Morrise. Defendant Bountiful 
City was represented by Stanley J. Preston. 
The Court having reviewed the file, pleadings, memoranda, 
and affidavits on file, having heard oral argument of counsel, and 
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being fully advised, concludes as follows: 
(a) Section 63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act, as amended in 19 84, provides absolute immunity to governmental 
entites from suit for any injury or damage resulting from the 
construction, repair and operation of a flood and storm system, 
or the mancigement of flood waters, and that plaintiff's allegations 
against Bountiful City fall within the absolute immunity provisions 
of §63-30-3. There are no material facts in dispute sufficient 
to overcome application of this statutory grant of absolute 
immunity in this case. Accordingly, Bountiful City is immune 
from suit for the injury or damage complained of by plaintiff 
here. 
(b) Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution 
is not self-executing. Accordingly, plaintiff's claim for inverse 
condemnation against Bountiful City is not actionable under the 
Utah Constitution. Even if Section 22 were self-executing, 
inverse condemnation actions thereunder would be limited to 
situations arising out of the taking or damaging of tangible 
private property for public use, intentionally made by public 
officers, and would not extend to actions arising out of negli-
gently tortious conduct. 
(c) Section 63-30-10.5 of the Governmental Immunity 
Act, to the extent it does authorize inverse condemnation actions, 
is limited in this same manner as Article I, Section 22 of the 
Utah Constitution, as set forth in subparagraph (b) above. 
Moreover, § 63-30-10.5, which was added to the Utah Governmental 
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Immunity Act in 1987, creates new substantive rights and is not 
retroactive to the claims against Bountiful City made in this 
case, which arise from actions pre-dating the 1987 Amendment, 
(d) There is no basis for an implied contract claim 
against Bountiful City given the nature of the dealings between 
the parties and the remote relationship between Bountiful City 
and plaintiff. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that 
Bountiful City's Motion for Summary Judgment is well taken, and 
as a matter of law, should be granted. However, the Court notes 
that plaintiff has filed a Motion to Amend its Complaint against 
Bountiful City in which it seeks to add a claim for inverse 
condemnation under Article V of the United States Constitution. 
The Court concludes that plaintiff shall have ten days from the 
date of this Order to amend its Complaint to assert such a claim. 
WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, 
that the causes of action asserted against Bountiful City in 
plaintiff's Complaint be, and hereby are, dismissed with prejudice 
and on the merits. however, plaintiff is granted ten days from 
the date of this Order to file an Amended Complaint in which it 
may assert only a claim against Bountiful City for inverse 
condemnation under Article V of the United States Constitution. 
In the event no such Amended Complaint is filed within said 
ten-day period, then a final judgment shall be, and hereby is, 
entered in favor of Bountiful City and against plaintiff, no 
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cause of action, each party to bear its own costs. 
DATED this \S day of September, 198 8, by the 
Court. 
^ a t f e , Rodney S District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
By: 
Paul D. Newfon 
Mark J. Morrise 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Plaintiff complains of Defendants as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Farmers New World Life Insurance Company ("Farmers"), 
is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the 
State of Washington. 
2. Bountiful City is a municipal corporation of the State 
of Utah and is located in Davis County, State of Utah, 
3. McNeil Construction is a Utah corporation with its 
principal place of business in Davis County, State of Utah. 
4. Interwest Construction is a Utah corporation with its 
principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
5. Sharp, Sorensen and Associates, fka Sharp/Pinegar & 
Associates, is a Utah corporation with its principal place of 
business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
6. Fashion Village Shopping Center is a Utah limited 
partnership registered with the Davis County Clerk, State of 
Utah. 
7. The Fashion Village Group is a limited partnership 
registered with the Davis County Clerk, State of Utah. 
8. Merrill W. Beck is an individual residing in Davis 
County, State of Utah. 
9. William W. Compton is believed to be an individual 
residing in the State of Pennsylvania. 
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10. John Does 1 through 5 are unknown persons or entities 
who Farmers shall join in this action once it learns of their 
identities. 
11. The acts that are the subject of this dispute occurred 
in Davis County, State of Utah. 
12. Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to § 78-3-4 of Utah 
Code Annotated. 
13. Venue is proper pursuant to §§ 78-12-1(1) and 78-13-7 
of the Utah Code Annotated. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
A. Construction of Building. 
14. On or about April 28, 1977, the architect, Sharp, 
Sorensen & Associates, prepared the original plans and drawings 
("Plans") for the construction of a commercial building upon real 
property located at approximately 500 South 200 West, Bountiful, 
Utah, which property was owned by Merrill W. Beck and William 
Compton. 
15. Merrill W. Beck and William Compton (the "Developers") 
employed Interwest Construction to build a commercial building 
pursuant to the Plans. 
16. Thereafter, Interwest Construction built a commercial 
building on the above real property now known as Fifth South 
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Plaza fka Fashion Square Village (hereinafter the real property 
and buildings shall be collectively referred to as ("the Mall"). 
17* Several feet from and running parallel to the south 
wall of the Mall is a waterway known as "Mill Creek." 
18. The Plans required Interwest Construction to do, among 
other things, the following: 
a. Install and grout reinforced steel in certain 
cells in the hollow, precast wall panels; 
b. Install and grout "L" shaped steel dowels into 
these grouted cells and into the floor slab; 
c. Improve Mill Creek; and 
d. Install an outside clean-out for the sewer line at 
the southwest corner of the building. 
19. Upon information and belief and contrary to the Plans, 
Interwest Construction: 
a. Did not install reinforced steel in all of the 
required cells in the wall panels; 
b. Did not group the reinforced steel in all of the 
required wall panels; 
c. Did not tie dowels into the walls and the floor; 
d. Did not grout the dowels in the wall panels; 
e. Did not improve the channel of Mill Creek; 
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f. Did not install an outside clean-out for the sewer 
line at the southwest corner of the building; and 
g. Did not perform other matters to be discovered 
during the pendency of this litigation. 
20. Trees, vegetation, and foliage which grew between the 
north bank of Mill Creek and the south wall of the Mall 
stabilized the soil between the Mall and Mill Creek. 
B. Transfer of Ownership of Mall. 
21. From about July 11, 1977 through September 11, 1979, 
Merrill W. Beck and William Compton conveyed the Mall to Fashion 
Village Shopping Center, a limited partnership. 
22. On or about September 11, 1979, Fashion Village 
Shopping Center, a limited partnership, conveyed the mall to The 
Fashion Village Group. 
23. On or about January 31, 1980, Farmers loaned The 
Fashion Village Group $1,450,000.00, secured by a Deed of Trust 
on the Mall. 
24. On or about January 10, 1983, Larry G. Moore, as 
successor trustee under the above Deed of Trust, conveyed title 
to the Mall to Farmers by way of a Trustee's Deed. 
C. Construction of Culvert. 
25. On or about March 29, 1973, Grea Dick Corporation 
conveyed to Bountiful City a perpetual right-of-way and easement 
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for any and all city, municipal, and utility purposes over a 
portion of the Mall. 
26. On or about October 16, 1975, Valley Corporation 
conveyed to Bountiful City a perpetual right-of-way and easement 
for the use of utility lines and creek maintenance across a 
portion of the Mall. 
27. On or about October 17, 1985, Farmers, at the request 
of Bountiful City, executed a right-of-way agreement for a creek 
easement, which agreement conveyed to Bountiful City "a perpetual 
right-of-way and easement for the purpose of digging, laying 
concrete, connecting to and maintaining, cleaning and operation 
[sic] a creek drainage facility." 
28. Upon information and belief, prior to October 17, 1985, 
Bountiful City had acquired a prescriptive right-of-way and 
easement over Mill Creek for the purpose of maintaining, 
operating, repairing, improving, and replacing the same. 
29. During the fall of 1985, Bountiful City advertised for 
and took bids from various contractors for the construction of a 
culvert and/or concrete channel lining ("Culvert") in Mill Creek. 
The segment of Mill Creek's channel to be lined included the 
entire segment adjacent to the south wall of the mall. 
30. After receiving bids, Bountiful City awarded the 
Culvert project to McNeil Construction. 
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31. By the construction contract for the Culvert project, 
Bountiful City required McNeil Construction to do, among other 
things, the following: 
a. To shore up, brace, underpin, sheet, and protect 
as may be necessary all foundations and other parts of all 
existing structures adjacent and adjoining the side of the 
project, which are in any way affected by the excavations or 
other operations connected with the completion of the work under 
the contract; 
b. To indemnify Bountiful City for any damages caused 
from the loss of lateral support of adjoining property and 
consequent damages to adjacent structures; 
c. To provide immediate, adequate protective 
construction, or to reinforce any shoring, bracing or sheeting as 
required by the engineer of Bountiful City; 
d. To divert Mill Creek so as to avoid damage to 
adjoining property; 
e. To avoid use of broken concrete asphalt, used 
reinforcing steel, and other rubble and debris as backfill; 
f. To scarify the fill area to a depth of six inches 
compacted to a specified density and in a specified manner; 
g. To grade the site work area by hand to specified 
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elevations, slopes and contours to effectuate proper drainage; 
and 
h. To use trench digging machines only if they will 
not cause damage to structures above or below the ground. 
32. Before the commencement of the construction of the 
Culvert project, the entire south wall of the Mall extended 
several feet below the surface of the adjacent soil. This soil, 
which formed the north embankment to Mill Creek, provided 
important subjacent lateral support to the exterior of the south 
wall by offsetting interior lateral pressure from backfill inside 
the wall. 
33. Contrary to the construction contract for the Culvert 
project, McNeil Construction: 
a. Did not install bracing or shoring to support the 
Mall after excavating and removing the soil between Mill Creek 
and the south wall of the Mall; 
b. Diverted water from Mill Creek directly next to 
and against the building; 
c. Included broken concrete, debris, rubble, etc. in 
the backfill; 
d. Did not compact soil used as backfill to required 
density and in specified manner; 
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e. Did not grade the site work areas to specified 
elevations, slopes, and contours; 
f. Used trench digging machines which damaged the 
Mall. 
34. The water which McNeil Construction diverted from Mill 
Creek directly against the south wall of the Mall seeped through 
spaces between the wall's concrete panels and caused "hydro 
compacting" of the fill material inside the wall and underneath 
the floor. 
35. Prior to the soil adjacent to the south wall of the 
Mall being replaced, Farmers discovered damage to the Mall 
structure caused by removal of lateral support to the south wall 
and diversion of Mill Creek directly against the Mail's south 
wall. This damage included cracks in the south wall and adjacent 
floor, tilting of wall panels, holes in the wall panels, and 
undue structural stress throughout the building, which may 
continue to occur. 
36. Only after Farmers had made several demands upon 
Bountiful City did McNeil Construction place backfill between the 
Culvert and the south wall of the Mall. 
37. The new backfill provided much less lateral support 
than the original soil adjacent to the south wall because the 
amount of new backfill was less than the original amount of soil, 
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was of poor grade, and was without significant density or 
compaction. 
38 • Due to the acts or omissions of one or more of the 
defendants, the fill under the floors in the Mall has recently 
settled, leaving a void between the floor slab and the fill, thus 
changing the slope of the main sewer drain and separating 
individual unit pipes from the main drainage. Raw sewage and 
water has flowed into the soil instead of the main drain, and use 
of restroom facilities for certain tenants in the Mall has been 
disrupted. 
39. Farmers has been damaged by the acts or failure to act 
of one or more of the defendants, which damages include, but are 
not limited to: (1) loss of income; (2) diminution in value of 
the Mall; and (3) cost of repair to the MallTs roof, floors, 
walls, plumbing, sewer, and fill; and, but not limited to, 
reclamation of vegetation behind the south wall of the Mall. 
40. Farmers has given notice of most of the defects to all 
the known Defendants; and not one has offered to remedy them. 
41. Farmers also has satisfied the notice requirements of 
§§ 63-30-11 and 63-30-13 of Utah Code Annotated. 
42. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, § 63-30-14, the claim 
submitted to Bountiful City is deemed denied because Bountiful 
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City or its insurance carrier has failed to approve or deny the 
claim. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence - McNeil Construction) 
43. This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through 
42 as though fully set forth herein. 
44. By virtue of the contract between Bountiful City and 
McNeil Construction, McNeil Construction agreed to perform the 
details of the contract, especially in regard to the method, 
means and manner of shoring and bracing adjacent foundations, 
walls and structures. 
45. In performing the excavation and construction work 
adjacent to the Mall, McNeil Construction owed Farmers a duty of 
reasonable care to not damage or injure the Mall. 
46. McNeil Construction failed to exercise reasonable care 
in the manner in which it excavated the area adjacent to the Mall 
by, among other things, removing almost all the soil adjacent to 
the south wall, failing to shore up and brace the south wall, 
diverting Mill Creek directly against the Mall's south wall, and 
by inadequately replacing the soil adjacent to the south wall. 
47. McNeil Construction's negligence caused damage to the 
Mall and to Farmers. 
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48. McNeil Construction is liable in damages to Farmers for 
its negligence, 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Trespass - McNeil Construction) 
49. This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through 
42 above as though fully set forth herein. 
50. Pursuant to the construction contract between Bountiful 
City and McNeil Construction, McNeil Construction trespassed on 
Farmer's Mall by entering thereon, removing Farmer's soil, 
failing to shore up and brace the south wall of the mall during 
construction, diverting water from Mill Creek directly against 
the Mall's south wall, and inadequately replacing the original 
soil, and otherwise abusing, unreasonably exercising, and 
exceeding the rights available to it under the easements in favor 
of Bountiful City. 
51. These trespasses caused damage to and seriously injured 
Farmers and its Mall. 
52. McNeil Construction is liable to Farmers for damages 
caused by these trespasses. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract - McNeil Construction) 
53. This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through 
42 as though fully set forth herein. 
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54. The construction contract for the Culvert between 
Bountiful City and McNeil Construction required McNeil 
Construction to shore up, brace, underpin, sheet, and protect as 
may be necessary all foundations and other parts of all existing 
structures adjacent to and adjoining the site of the Culvert 
construction project. 
55. This contract further required McNeil Construction to 
provide, install, and maintain adequate sheeting and bracing to 
support the sides of banks of excavation. 
56. This contract further required McNeil Construction to 
divert Mill Creek so as to avoid damage to the adjoining 
property. 
57. Farmers is a third party beneficiary of the above-
described contract. 
58. McNeil Construction breached its contract with 
Bountiful City and with Farmers as a third party beneficiary of 
the contract by failing to provide necessary and adequate 
shoring, bracing, and underpinning as required for the 
foundation, walls, floors, and ceilings for Farmers1 building. 
59. McNeil Construction is liable to Farmers for damages 
caused by McNeil Construction's breach of the contract. 
14 
000072 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Inverse Condemnation - Diversion of Mill Creek) 
60. This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through 
42 as though fully set forth herein. 
61. By virtue of the contract between Bountiful City and 
McNeil Construction, Bountiful City retained the right and 
authority to control the method, means, and manner that McNeil 
Construction would perform the details of the contract, including 
the method, means, and manner of diverting Mill Creek during 
construction. 
62. During the construction of the Culvert project, 
Bountiful City did in fact exercise control over, and was aware 
of and approved of, how McNeil Construction diverted Mill Creek 
against the south wall of the Mall. 
63. By virtue of the control retained and exercised by 
Bountiful City over McNeil Construction's diversion of Mill Creek 
against the south wall and by virtue of Bountiful City?s 
awareness of and approval of that diversion, Bountiful City is 
liable for the diversion and its effects. 
64. As previously alleged, the water that Bountiful City 
diverted from Mill Creek against the south wall of the Mall 
seeped through the spaces between the wall's concrete panels, 
causing a "hydro compacting" of the fill material inside the 
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south wall and underneath the Mall floor. As also previously 
alleged, this hydro compacting caused permanent damage to the 
Mall. 
65. Bountiful City's diversion of Mill Creek and the 
resulting seepage and hydro compaction constitute an actual 
physical invasion of the Mall by a superinduced addition of water 
from Mill Creek against the south wall of the Mall. This 
superinduced addition of water effectually impaired the 
usefulness of the Mall and substantially impaired and reduced the 
value of the Mall by virtue of the permanent damage it caused to 
the Mall. Such impairment of usefulness and value was a natural 
and foreseeable consequence of the superinduced addition of 
water. 
66. Bountiful City's impairment of the usefulness and value 
of the Mall constitutes a taking of private property for public 
use within the scope of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
67. Farmers is entitled and requests just compensation for 
this taking and its attendant reduction of the value of the Mall. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Inverse Condemnation - Unreasonable Removal of Lateral Support) 
68. This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through 
42 as though fully set forth herein. 
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69. By virtue of the contract between Bountiful City and 
McNeil Construction, Bountiful City retained the right and 
authority to control the method, means, and manner that McNeil 
Construction would perform the details of that contract, 
including the method, means, and manner of removing and replacing 
soil adjacent to nearby foundations, walls and structures, and of 
shoring and bracing adjacent foundations, walls and structures. 
70. During the construction of the Culvert project, 
Bountiful City did in fact exercise control over, and was aware 
of and approved of, how McNeil Construction removed and replaced 
the soil adjacent to the south wall, and how McNeil shored and 
braced the south wall. 
71. By virtue of the control retained and exercised by 
Bountiful City over McNeil Construction's acts, and by virtue of 
Bountiful City's awareness and approval of those acts, Bountiful 
City is liable for McNeil Construction's acts and the effects of 
those acts in removing the original soil adjacent to the south 
wall of the Mall, in failing to shore and brace the south wall, 
in first failing to replace the original soil adjacent to the 
south wall, and in eventually replacing the original soil with an 
insufficient amount of backfill, of poor grade, and without 
significant density or compaction. 
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72. As an owner of land adjacent to Mill Creek, Farmers has 
a legal right to reasonable lateral support of its land. Such 
right to lateral support is an interest in land. 
73. In constructing the Culvert project, Bountiful City 
unreasonably removed the lateral support from the south wall of 
Farmer's Mall. This removal of lateral support caused permanent 
damage to the Mall so as to interfere with Farmers' use of the 
Mall and substantially impair and reduce the value of the Mall. 
74. The impairment of the usefulness and value of the Mall 
caused by Bountiful City's unreasonable removal of lateral 
support to the Mall constitutes a taking of private property for 
public use within the scope of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 
75. Farmers is entitled to and requests just compensation 
for this taking and its attendant reduction of the value of the 
Mall. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Inverse Condemnation - Foreseeable and Natural Consequences) 
76. This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through 
42, 61 through 63, and 69 through 71, as though fully set forth 
herein. 
77. Prior to undertaking construction of the Culvert, 
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Bountiful City knew that a necessary part of construction would 
be the diversion of Mill Creek during the construction. 
78. The foreseeable and natural consequences of the 
diversion of Mill Creek included the following: 
A. That water from Mill Creek would be diverted 
against the south wall of the Mall; 
B. That such a diversion would require the removal of 
the soil laterally supporting the south wall; 
C. That the removal of such lateral support would 
probably cause permanent damage to the Mall, thus impairing and 
reducing the value of the Mall; 
D. That the diverted Mill Creek water would seep 
through the south wall; and 
E. That such seepage would also probably impair or 
reduce the value of the Mall by causing permanent damage to the 
Mall. 
79. Bountiful City intentionally and deliberately proceeded 
with the Culvert project and its necessary creek diversion, with 
full awareness of the natural, foreseeable, and probable 
consequences of such diversion. By so proceeding, Bountiful City 




80. The direct and immediate result of such natural and 
foreseeable consequences, without regard to the negligence or 
non-negligence of McNeil Construction, was interference with 
Farmers1 use of the Mall and substantial reduction and impairment 
of the value of that the Mall. 
81. Such impairment of the usefullness and value of the 
Mall, being a natural and foreseeable consequence of Bountiful 
City's intentional and deliberate acts, is a taking within the 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
82. Farmers is entitled to and requests just compensation 
for this taking. 
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Inverse Condemnation - Fault of Bountiful City) 
83. This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through 
42 as though fully set forth herein, and such other paragraphs as 
are referred to herein. 
84. Bountiful City is at fault in causing and allowing the 
diversion of Mill Creek against the south wall and in causing and 
allowing the unreasonable removal of the lateral support to the 
south wall, as previously alleged, for one or more of the 
following reasons: 
A. Inherent in the construction of the Culvert was a 
risk of physical harm to Farmers unless special precautions were 
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taken. Such precautions included proper diversion of Mill Creek 
so as to not damage the Mall and shoring and bracing of the south 
wall of the Mall. Bountiful City had a non-delegable duty to 
oversee the project and ensure that such precautions were taken. 
Bountiful City failed to do this, and therefore is liable for 
McNeil Construction's failure to take such precautions, as 
previously alleged. 
B. Bountiful City planned the construction of the 
project in a manner such that, to the extent McNeil Construction 
followed those plans, harm would result to the Mall. Because of 
this faulty planning by Bountiful City, Bountiful City is liable 
for damages caused to the Mall, as previously alleged. 
C. Bountiful City had a non-delegable duty to insure 
that the lateral support to the south wall was not unreasonably 
withdrawn. Therefore, Bountiful City is liable for McNeil 
Construction's unreasonable withdrawal of that support, as 
previously alleged. 
D. During the construction of the Culvert, Bountiful 
City became aware that McNeil Construction had acted unlawfully 
and tortiously by unreasonably removing lateral support to the 
south wall, failing to provide bracing and shoring to the wall, 
diverting water from Mill Creek next to the south wall, and 
failing to adequately replace the original soil adjacent to the 
21 
000079 
wall. When Bountiful City became aware of such unlawful and 
tortious acts, it had the duty to prevent or remedy that conduct. 
Bountiful City failed to do so, and in fact inspected and 
accepted the conduct, and therefore is liable for the conduct. 
E. McNeil Construction was the agent of Bountiful 
City, as previously alleged in paragraphs 61 through 63 and 71 
through 73. Therefore, Bountiful City is liable for the 
negligent acts of McNeil Construction, as previously alleged. 
85. Because of the fault of Bountiful City, the Mall was 
permanently damaged, thereby causing a substantial reduction and 
impairment of its value, as previously alleged. 
86. Such reduction and impairment of value is a taking of 
private property for public use within the scope of the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
87. Farmers is entitled to and requests just compensation 
for this taking and its attendant reduction of the value of 
Farmer's real estate. 
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligent Construction - Interwest Construction 
and John Does 1 through 5) 
88. This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through 
42 as though fully set forth herein. 
89. Interwest Construction is the general contractor who 
originally constructed the Mall. 
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NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract - Interwest Construction) 
95* This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through 
42 as thoucjh fully set forth herein, 
96. Upon information and belief, the contract between the 
Developers and Interwest Construction required Interwest 
Construction to construct the building in accordance with the 
Plans. 
97. farmers is a third party beneficiary of that 
construction contract. 
98. Interwest Construction breached its contract with the 
developers and Farmers as a third party beneficiary by failing to 
perform those duties more particularly described in paragraph 19 
herein. 
99. Accordingly, Interwest Construction is liable in 
damages to Farmers for breach of that contract. 
TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence - Sharp, Sorensen & Associates) 
100. This cause of action incorporates paragraphs 1 through 
42 as though fully set forth herein. 
101. Sharp, Sorensen & Associates designed the Mall and 
prepared the Plans used by Interwest Construction, the general 
contractor, who originally built the Mall. 
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108. On information and belief, Farmers alleges that the 
original purchaser of the Mall was a business entity known as the 
Fashion Village Shopping Center in which Merrill W. Beck and 
William Compton were general partners. 
109. On information an belief, Farmers alleges that Merrill 
W. Beck and William Compton were the persons who developed and 
sold the Mall to the Fashion Village Shopping Center. 
110. On information and belief, Farmers alleges that at the 
time Beck and Compton sold the Mall to the original purchaser, 
the Mall contained hidden and latent defects that the original 
purchaser could not have discovered by a reasonable inspection at 
the time of sale. These defects included, among other things, an 
improper joining of the south wall to the floor and an improper 
placement of backfill inside the building. 
111. The defects manifested themselves during the course of 
construction of the Culvert. 
112. Upon information and belief, the original purchaser was 
unaware of the above-described defects at the time of the sale. 
113. The above-described defects are so serious and affect 
such an integral part of the Mall as to render the Mall 
uninhabitable by the business entities that occupy the Mall and 
unfit for its intended use as a commercial structure. 
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120. The above-described defects and breach of implied and 
express warranties have damaged Farmers. 
121. Merrill W. Beck, William Compton, Interwest 
Construction, Fashion Village Shopping Center, and The Fashion 
Village Group are liable in damages to Farmers for those defects. 
PRAYER 
Plaintiff prays for the following relief: 
1. For judgment in an amount not yet determined against 
all Defendants for all damage caused by these Defendants, 
including compensatory and consequential damages. 
2. For just compensation for the takings made by Bountiful 
City. 
3. For all reasonable costs in bringing this action, 
including costs of court and reasonable attorney's fees. 
4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems 
just and proper. 
DATED this ^ 3 a a y Qf S*fl f?rv\ W V~ , 1988. 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
James L. tbfristensen 
Paul D, Newton 
Mark J. Morrise 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
T hereby certify that or> ..his day of 5$0 ^ m V^ r 
1988, I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct co'p'y of the 
foregoing FIRST AMENDED roMPI^TMT f,, 
Robert F. Babcock 
Attorney for Interwes* Consirucl ion 
254 West 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake CI -\\ 'Jt.ah '•• 'H n ' 
Keith i I rteaae 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorney for Sharp, Sorensei i S P ssoci ates 
525 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah h410z. 
W. Durre11 Nie1sen 
NIELSEN & DIXON, P.C 
Attorneys for Defendant Tin-* Fashion i 11 .inje Croup 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Streel 
Salt Lakp <"* -•• v*-?K 
Wil . a::- *.. Compton 
30 LaJLiey D r i v e 
Washington Crossing . FA 1897 / 
Greyo-Ly J. Sandeib 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, r. 
Attorney for Defendant McNeiI Construction 
City Center I No ~*'"> 
175 East 400 sou* . 
S a l t L a k e C i t y . U t a h <<HLL -/-;.<] 
Darv^: r, ; , H a n s e n 
• • *
x
 ' ' - h C F I " 
.-n.LUi.ney foi j e i e r i a a . m i l Beck 
and F a s h i o n V i l l a g e i n a C e n t e r 
'*rt C e n t e r S t r e t ' 
in i * ' v" t w ~v* 0 > , . ^ , 
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Stanley J. Preston 
SHOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorney for Bountiful City 
P. 0. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Farmers.cmp 
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ALLAN L. LARSON 
STANLEY J. PRESTON 
ROBERT C. KELLER 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Bountiful Ci 1: y 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 , 
Telephone: < 8": . 521-90'/-'. 
FSLE .0 1M C: [;<•:[': rif^ir 
0AV!S CGUNIY, ( jTAfi^ 
io r.zr *v 
-J&.. 
:f;K 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 'T)URT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
FARMERS NEW WORLD LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plain Li t I. 
v. 
BOUNTIFUL CITY, McNEIL 
CONSTRUCTION, SHARP SORENSEN 
AND ASSOCIATES, INTERWEST 
CONSTRUCTION, FASHION VILLAGE 
SHOPPING CENTER,, a partnership 
THE FASHION VILLAGE GROUP, 
MERRILL W. BECK, WILLIAM 
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.; 1. S 111 1, S S H P Defendant Bount It u1 City's Motion 
rec" i.irl • ~ r \ * ' * * 
Hoi t . .iic^ j U.JL t^'-JiJihj, *,Li '-uvember < . 
Plaintiff was represented by Jame.i :hristensen. Defendant 
Bountiful C:*— ,a:. T • r . • • . ' : '• - <)n. 
*'.\e CCui ', :,^vM*<-i rovidwevj L^e L.J^.-, \J leadings, memoranda, 
FILMED 
OPCOS'J 
and affidavits on file, having heard oral argument of counsel, 
and being fully advised, has now issued its Ruling dated December 
7, 1988, in which it treated defendant Bountiful City's Motion to 
Dismiss as a Motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant to Rule 12(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, In its Ruling, the Court 
concluded as follows: 
In its First Amended Complaint, plaintiff alleges various 
causes of action against defendant Bountiful City based upon 
inverse condemnation. The Court finds that under none of the 
facts suggested or set forth in the pleadings of the plaintiff is 
there a taking so as to bring the matter within the purview of 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
therefore grants defendant Bountiful City's Motion, 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that defendant 
Bountiful City's Motion for Summary Judgment is well taken, and, 
as a matter of law, should be granted. 
WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS 
FOLLOWS: Defendant Bountiful City's Motion to Dismiss dated 
October 17, 1988, is hereby granted and all causes of action 
asserted against Bountiful City in plaintiff's First Amended 
Complaint are hereby dismissed with prejudice and upon the 
merits, each party to bear its own costs and attorneys' fees. 
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Furthermore, -vr-ini.1 • ~:z". ••> *" ; , , , 31*^  : ; 
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"
ED f
 •"'" . ^ y . 1 ^ . i3'-'-*' o f ^ e c e m h o r , I 9 8 8 . 
B Y T * ^ • • , ; : • . 
ROD EY S . JPAUE', D i s t r i c t J u d g 
APPROVED Ai> , ' j JTMJRM: 
CORBRIDGE r <"*-: *r- O CHRISTENSEN 
V 
L . <&HR] 
By /V\ L<AJ@J\ ' / nc^l/vuijg 
JAMES  (S lRISTENSEN 
PAUL D. NEWTON 
MARK J. MORRISE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Farmers 




AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
SS . 
COUNTY OF SALT1 LAKE 
Ji: , ;;. 5RGWN, being duly sworn, says than she is employed 
in the law offices of Snow, Christiansen & Martineau, attorneys 
f o r
 Defendant Bountiful. City 
herein; rnac she served the attached" ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
___ Summary Judcfment
 i _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . ._, 
(Case Mo. 413 4 0 JL3.V1 S 
U wV tiner ec * 
•istec oeiow cy placing 
an envelooe addressed to: 
rev- ^  
Attorneys for Plaintiff: 
James L. Christensen 
Paul D. Newton 
Mark J. .Morrise 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD * CHRISTENSEN 
215 South. State Street, Suite 3 00 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for McNeil Const.; 
Gregory J. Sanders 
J. Mark Whimpey 
KIPP 5c CHRISTIAN, ?.C. 
175 East 400 South, S U . L - JJ.J 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Attorneys for Sharp,_Sorensen: 
Keith W. Meade 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT , .^EHAL 
525 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84.102 
Attorneys for Interwest: 
Robert F. Babock 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
254 West 400 South, Suite 20 0 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Fashion Village Giou,', 
W. Durrell Nielsen 
NIELSEN k DIXCN 
: 200 Beneficial L^fe :*-• 
i6 South State Street: 
Salt Lake City, Utah i -, 1 .1 
Attorneys for Merrill W, Beck: 
Darvin C. Hansen 
HANSEN & CRIST 
110 West Center Street 
Bountiful, Utah 3 4 010 
William W. Ccmpton 
9 7 S C r e amerv ?vo a d 
Newton, P* ^13940 
and causing the same to be mailed firsi 
on the 16th day of December 
- -. Ji ^ O ocs tac t ; epa ic , 
( 
..SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me cai.. 
Decemb^1- 19 88. 
V 
Hv Commi s s i o n Zxjp i r e s : 
• V - . > ; - V < : 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Res id ing in the S t a t e of Utah 
